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FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN THE STATES FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CONSTITUTION-
ALITY, STATUTORY POWER, AND POLICY
When outbreaks of domestic violence in the wake of the civil
rights movement have necessitated a federal presence in the form
of troops or marshals to maintain public order, section 333 of title
10 of the United States Code has been invoked by federal authori-
ties to authorize federal intervention. Section 333, a long-dormant
and little-discussed remnant of reconstruction legislation, was en-
acted in order to secure the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
of equal protection of the laws. Judicious exertion of the powers
conferred by this statute may serve both remedial and deterrent
functions for the suppression of mass violence which the states are
unwilling or unable to control.
D URING the past decade racial violence in the South has raised the
question of federal power to intervene with force to quell domestic
violence within the states.1 The initial use of federal power in this
period was occasioned by the 1957 desegregation crisis in Little
Rock, Arkansas. In that instance the presence of troops was di-
rectly related to the enforcement of federal court orders requiring
the integration of the Little Rock schools. 2 When a court order is
involved, the authority to employ federal troops to enforce that
order is generally conceded.3 We shall be concerned with the more
:See generally U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL
PROTECTION IN THE SoUTH 1-99 (1965); 1961 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTs COMM'N REP., JuSTICE
1-44.
2 See Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957) (enjoining Governor
Faubus from using military force to block desegregation); Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp.
855 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957) (approving a plan of integration
for the school district).
3 See, e.g., Faust, The President's Use of Troops to Enforce Federal Law, 7 Cixv.-
MAR. L. REV. 362 (1958); Pollitt, A Dissenting View: The Executive Enforcement of
Judicial Decrees, 45 A.B.A.J. 600 (1959); Schmetterer, Reply to Mr. Schweppe: Military
Enforcement of Court Decrees, 44 A.B.A.J. 727 (1958); Comment, 56 MiCH. L. REv.
249 (1957). The position of the Justice Department on the Little Rock intervention
is found in 41 Ops. AT'r'y GEN. 313 (1957).
The view that troops may be used to enforce a federal court order has, however,
been questioned. See Schweppe, Enforcement of Federal Court Decrees: A "Recurrence
to Fundamental Principles," 44 A.BA.J. 113 (1958).
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controversial issue of the use of federal power to suppress domestic
violence in the absence of a court order.
This discussion essentially concerns a principal source of po-
tential federal power over domestic disorder, namely, section 333 of
title 10 of the United States Code,4 which reads as follows:
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or
both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he con-
siders necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic
violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it-
(1) so hinders the execution of laws of that State, and of the
United States within the State, that any part or class of its people
is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in
the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authori-
ties of that State are unable, fail or refuse to protect that right,
privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the
United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be con-
sidered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured
by the Constitution.5
The "vague powers conferred by this measure" have become the
focal point of considerable controversy in recent years. The statute
was invoked by the Justice Department in Little Rock in 1957, in
Montgomery, Alabama, in 1961,7 at the University of Mississippi
in 1962,8 and at the University of Alabama in 1963;1 but each of
these incidents involved federal court orders.'0
'10 U.S.C. § 333 (1964) (originally enacted as the Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22,
§ 3, 17 Stat. 14, and first codified as Rxv. STAT. § 5299 (1875); re-enacted in the present
form by the Act of August 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 333, 70A Stat. 15).
Two other federal statutes relate to the use of the military in domestic matters:
10 U.S.C. § 331 (1964), implements article IV, § 4 of the Constitution by providing
for the utilization of federal troops to suppress insurrection upon request of the state
legislature, or of the state executive if the legislature cannot convene.
Section 332 of title 10, U.S.C., completes the trilogy, authorizing the use of the
armed forces or militia without prerequisite state consent whenever it becomes "im-
practicable" to execute federal laws by the ordinary judicial processes because of
violence or other obstruction. It will be noticed that § 332 is quite similar in terms
to paragraph 2 of § 333. A chief difference is that § 333 offers a wider choice of
avenues to the President, by providing for the use of the militia, armed forces, or
"any other means."
10 U.S.C. § 333 (1964).
6 CORWIN, THE PRESmENT 135 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
7 N.Y. Times, May 21, 1961, p. 78, col. 8.
8Id., Sept. 30, 1962, p. 68, cols. 1-3.
9Id., June 12, 1963, p. 21, cols. 2-4; id., Sept. 11, 1963, p. 31, cols. 2-3.
10 For the court order involved in the Montgomery situation, see United States v.
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The first action taken by the Government pursuant to section
333 in the absence of a court order occurred in Alabama in June
1963. A five-week crisis in Birmingham preceded federal inter-
vention. During this period there were numerous Negro demon-
strations and outbreaks of rioting and disorder, but the Kennedy
Administration maintained that it was impotent to interpose
federal force.1 A significant change in this position followed re-
newed rioting on May 13, incited by the bombing of an integration
leader's home and a Negro motel. 12 Federal troops were dispatched
to bases in the vicinity of Birmingham in preparation for service
if needed.13 The statutory authority for this action was explicitly
stated to be section, 333, paragraph 1.14 The sudden assertion of
power under this long latent statute was defended by the Attorney
General on the theory that the severity of the rioting had increased
significantly and that the Alabama state police were tending to in-
U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961). Court
action in connection with the University of Mississippi crisis includes United States v.
Barnett, 330 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1963), afJ'd, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Meredith v. Fair,
306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1962); Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962). Federal action at the University of Alabama was based
upon a series of orders commencing with Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D.
Ala.), aft'd, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956).
"1 President Kennedy was quoted at a news conference as follows: "We have, in
addition, been watching the present controversy to detect any violations of the Federal
civil rights-or rather, statutes. In the absence of such violations or any other Federal
jurisdiction, our efforts have been focused on getting both sides together to settle
in a peaceful fashion the very real abuses too long inflicted on the Negro citizens of
that community." N.Y. Times, May 9, 1963, p. 16, cols. 1-2. (Emphasis added.)
An attempt to determine whether Mr. Kennedy felt that the Government lacked
legal power to act or whether, on the other hand, the decision had been made not
to utilize such power at that time produced the following colloquy:
"Q. Mr. President, in the Alabama crisis in Birmingham, according to your inter-
pretation of the powers of the Presidency, was there a power that you possess, either
by statute or the Constitution, that you chose not to invoke, or did you use your powers,
in your view, to the fullest in this controversy?
"A. There isn't any Federal statute that is-was involved in the last few days in
Birmingham, Ala. I indicated the areas where the Federal Government had inter-
vened in Birmingham-the matter of voting, the matter of dealing with education,
other matters. On the specific question of the parades, that did not involve a Federal
statute.
"Q. Mr. President, two Negro students are ...
"A.-As I indicated in my answer-and that is the reason why Mr. Marshall has
been proceeding in the way he has-and we have not had, for example, a legal suit,
as we have had in some other cases that-where there was a Federal statute involved."
Ibid.1
"Id., May 13, 1963, p. 1, col. 8.
13 Ibid.
1" See the reply by President Kennedy to Governor Wallace's inquiry as to the
authority for the troop movements to Alabama, id., May 14, 1963, p. 26, cols. 2-3.
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flame rather than to pacify the situation, thus producing a condi-
tion "quite different" from that existing previously.15
Governor Wallace responded to this mild Kennedy initiative
by filing a motion for leave to interpose an original bill of com-
plaint in the United States Supreme Court, praying for both declara-
tory and injunctive relief to effect the removal of the troops from
the state of Alabama.16 The Supreme Court denied the motion on
the ground that the troop movements were "preparatory measures"
only;' 7 hence the issue of statutory authorization for their commit-
ment to action under circumstances such as existed in Birmingham
was not at that time ripe. Thus, the disposition of the case in no
way resolved any interpretive difficulties posed by section 333.1
The next major crisis raising the federal intervention problem
involved the murder of three civil rights workers in Neshoba
County, Mississippi, in June of 1964. Here the issue was one of
federal "police action" to provide protection for civil rights workers
in that state. Attorney General Kennedy ostensibly took the position
that such intervention was legally impossible.'9 This view provoked
immediate and vigorous dissent, including a statement issued by
twenty-nine professors of law which declared that there was "no
15 Id. at 26, col. 2.
16 One of Governor Wallace's major objections to the troop movements was that
Alabama had not requested federal aid to suppress insurrection as is specified by
article IV, § 4 of the federal Constitution. Brief for Plaintiffs, pp. 11-12, Alabama v.
United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963). It may be pointed out here that 10 U.S.C. § 331
(1964) implements article IV, § 4 of the Constitution by providing for utilization
of federal troops to suppress insurrection upon request of the state legislature, or of the
state executive if the legislature cannot convene. On the other hand, § 333 was en-
acted pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, and hence is independent of
article IV, § 4, even if the latter is read to require a request of the state as a condi-
tion precedent to federal intervention.
1.7Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963) (per curiam).
18 The Justice Department asked that leave to file an original action in the Supreme
Court be denied on the express ground that the complaint lacked substantial merit
and requested the Court to underscore the President's authority under § 333:
"A prompt decision authoritatively determining the powers of the President may
reduce the danger of domestic violence and of unlawful combinations and con-
spiracies depriving citizens of constitutional rights that a State may be unable or
unwilling to protect. We accordingly urge the Court, in its disposition of the plaintiffs'
motion, to make it clear that the President is not without power, should future
eventualities require it, to take upon his own initiative those steps authorized by
Section 333 in order to safeguard the constitutional rights of citizens of the United
States." Brief for Defendants, p. 7.
19 The Attorney General reportedly told an NAACP delegation that federal pre-
ventative police action could not be taken because of the division of powers between
the state and national governments. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1964, p. 1, col. 5. He was
otherwise quoted as saying that the situation was "'a local matter for local law en-
forcement'" and that federal authority was "'very, very limited.'" Id. p. 18, col. 8.
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question" but that paragraph 2 of section 333 authorized federal
"police action" to protect civil rights workers in circumstances
such as those which existed in Mississippi.20
The final incident to be noted involved the attack upon civil
rights demonstrators by state troopers and others in Selma, Alabama,
in March 1965. That situation is significant, not because of the ex-
tent of federal involvement, which, prior to the Selma-Montgomery
march was rather limited, but because the Justice Department al-
tered its previous position concerning section 333. The power to
intervene was no longer denied, but the primary responsibility of
local law enforcement and the grave character of a military solution
continued to be major themes.21
The Historical Context of Section 333
In order to understand the function and scope of section 333,
it is necessary to consider the conditions under which it was en-
acted and the evils it was intended to remedy. The statutory prede-
cessor of section 333 was originally a part of the Third Enforce-
ment Act,22 which was a comprehensive scheme of federal civil rights
legislation 23 adopted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
20 The full text of the professors' statement can be found in 110 CONG. REc.
15851-52 (1964) (submitted by Senator Javits), and an abridged version is in N.Y.
Times, July 1, 1964, p. 23, cols. 2-3. Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach's reply, 110
CONG. REc. 18661-62 (1964) (submitted by Representative Lindsay), emphasized that
law enforcement is a local responsibility and stated that § 333 contemplates circum-
stances "where there has been such a complete breakdown of law and order that civilian
law enforcement measures are overwhelmed and use of armed forces is required."
Id. at 18662. The purpose of § 333, viewed against the background of its historical
setting, indicates, as we shall see, that Mr. Katzenbach was more nearly correct.
The professors were not without influence, however, as they inspired a facile in-
terpretation by Time magazine to the effect that § 333 "fully empowers the President
to use all necessary force on every foot of American soil to uphold the constitutional
rights of 'any part or class' of U.S. citizens whenever local officials fail to do so."
Time, Nov. 19, 1965, p. 76. Unfortunately, this expansive interpretation appears to be
somewhat confused, combining haphazardly Supreme Court dicta, disparate elements
from the professors' statement, and a portion of § 333 (paragraph 1) specifially ex-
cluded by the professors from their argument.
21 See the statements of Mr. Katzenbach in N.Y. Times, March 10, 1965, p. 23, cols.
7-8. The respective attitudes of Mr. Robert Kennedy and Mr. Katzenbach are discussed
in id., March 14, 1965, § 4 (Editorials), p. E4, cols. 4-8.
22 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
The First Enforcement Act is the Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, which
was amended by the Enforcement Act of February 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433.
These statutes dealt primarily with the protection of voting rights.
23 The Third Enforcement Act contained six sections, which may be summarized
as follows:
The first section, Rav. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), provided for
Vol. 1966: 41.5]
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ment in order to secure the rights guaranteed by section 1 of that
amendment.24  This statute is sometimes known as the Ku Klux
civil suits against anyone who "under color of law" deprived another of "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .... ." This section, as it is
still in effect, may play an increasing role in federal civil rights litigation since it was
given a more expansive interpretation in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See
note 34 infra.
Section 2 was a conspiracy statute providing both criminal and civil remedies.
Within its terms was a lengthy series of forbidden activities which included the
overthrow of the United States Government, hindering any United States officer from
carrying out his duties, threatening any witness or juror in any federal court pro-
ceeding, or intimidating anyone in his lawful support of a candidate for federal
elective office. Section 2 was divided and incorporated into several sections of the
Revised Statutes (e.g., Rav. STAT. §§ 629, 699, 5336, 5406-07, 5518, 5520 (1875)), most
of which have now been repealed. The most expansive portions of the section have
long been dead letters. In the original statute, both civil and criminal penalties were
provided for conspiracy to deprive "any person or any class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws." The
criminal portion, as Rv. STAT. § 5519 (1875), was declared unconstitutional in United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), on the ground that the statute was aimed at the
action of individuals whereas the fourteenth amendment was directed solely as a
limitation upon the states. The provision for civil damages is now 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3)
(1964), but in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), the Court in dismissing for
failure to state a cause of action added by way of dictum that as far as the action of
private citizens was concerned only a massive and active conspiratorial organization
such as the Klan of 1871 could deprive individuals of equal protection, and in that
instance grave constitutional issues might be raised because of this very attempt to
reach individual action. Id. at 658-59, 662.
Section 3 was the predecessor of § 333.
The fourth section, 17 Stat. 14 (1871), provided that whenever unlawful combina-
tions became so powerful as to "overthrow or set at defiance" state and federal authority
within the state, or when the state authorities were in complicity with the unlawful
combination, such combinations were to be deemed a rebellion and the President
was authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in the rebellious areas. This pro-
vision expired by its own terms at the end of the next regular session of Congress.
Section 5, 17 Stat. 15 (1871), provided that no one in complicity with the illegal
combinations (i.e., the Klan) could serve as a federal juror and prescribed an ex-
culpatory oath to that effect.
Section 6, ibid., created a civil cause of action against any person who, having
knowledge of a conspiracy described in § 2, failed to attempt to prevent the contem-
plated crime.
It may be noticed that §§ 1-4 constitute a systematic scheme to provide remedies for
violence occurring on varying scales and degrees of intensity. Section 1 leaves the
initiative to the individual victim of wrongdoing; § 2 deals with conspiracies through
the ordinary civil processes. On the other hand, § 3 was aimed at conspiratorial organi-
zations whose suppression may require the aid of the military, and § 4 contemplates
full-scale rebellion or official complicity in the conspiratorial designs.
2' "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5.
[Vol. 1966: 415i
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Klan Act, for it was directed primarily against the terror tactics of
that organization.
The extent of the disorder fomented by Klan activity in the
South in 1871 was a matter of some conjecture, congressional
opinion being sharply divided along party lines. The Democrats
claimed that the crime rate in the North compared unfavorably
with conditions in the South.2 5 The Forty-second Congress did have
before it the report of a Select Committee of the Senate to Investi-
gate Alleged Outrages in the Southern States, the Radical majority
of which concluded that there was widespread violence and a com-
bination or conspiracy 26 of awesome proportions27 rendering the
insecurely held Radical state governments impotent.28 This un-
25 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 91 (1871) (remarks of Representative
Duke); id. at 131 (remarks of Representative Brooks).
The opposition Democrats alternatively argued (a) that there was no crime problem
in the South, e.g., id. at 337 (remarks of Representative Whitthorne), and (b) that
any unrest or violence was the result of the policies of the Radical party, e.g., id.
at 421-25 (remarks of Representative Winchester).
20 "[I]t is clearly established-Ist. That the Ku-Klux organization does exist, has a
political purpose, is composed of members of the democratic or conservative party,
has sought to carry out its purpose by murders, whippings, intimidations, and violence,
against its opponents. 2nd. That it not only binds its members to carry out decrees
of crime, but protects them against conviction and punishment, first by disguises
and secrecy; second, by perjury, if necessary, upon the witness stand and in the jury
box. 3rd. That of all the offenders against the law in this order, (and they must be
many hundreds, if not thousands, because these crimes are shown to be committed
by organized bands ranging from ten up to seventy-five) not one has yet been
convicted in the whole State [of North Carolina]." S. REP. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
XXX-XXXI (1871).
This Senate report also purports to document some 137 attacks (most in the form
of whippings) perpetrated by the Klan upon Negroes and white Republicans in
North Carolina over a two-year period. Id. at XIX-XX. United States Attorney Gen-
eral Ackerman estimated that the "unlawful combination" embraced two-thirds of the
active white men in the state with the majority of the remainder sympathetic. H.R.
ExEc. Doc. No. 268, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1872).
27Republican estimates of Klan strength in North Carolina alone ranged from
10,000 to 40,000 and up. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1871) (remarks of
Senator Sherman); id. at 340 (remarks of Representative Kelley); id. at app. 169 (re-
marks of Senator Pool).
As to the views of later historians, Randall and Donald state that the Klan at-
tained "considerable dimensions" by 1871. RANDALL & DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 683 (2d ed. 1961). Oberholtzer mentions that the Klan claimed
550,000 members as early as 1868, but also points out that this is a mere guess.
2 0BERHOLTzER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 343 (1922). See
generally MoRIsoN, THE OxFoRo HISTORY or TE AMERICAN PEOPLE 720-25 (1965).
28 The state of affairs from the Radical viewpoint was well summed up by Repre-
sentative Cobum of Indiana:
"Such, then, is the character of these outrages-numerous, repeated, continued
from month to month and year to year, extending over many States; all similar in
character, aimed at a similar class of citizens; all palliated or excused or justified or
absolutely denied by the same class of men. Not like the local outbreaks sometimes
Vol. 1966: 415]
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lawful combination constituted the nature and extent of the evil
which the Radical-controlled Congress attempted to eradicate and
indicates the general character of the circumstances under which
appeal to section 333 would be appropriate.
Thus Congress in the Third Enforcement Act fashioned a
statute designed to pacify the South and to remove the pressure
which was allegedly being exerted against the besieged state govern-
ments. 29 These objectives were to be accomplished by federalizing
those aspects of the criminal law relating to crimes directed against
the exercise of civil rights. The use of federal troops was designed
to supply a military solution in areas of the most widespread vio-
lence, but for the most part the troops were to operate in aid of the
federal courts by apprehending violators of federal criminal civil
rights legislation as then contained in the Enforcement Acts.80 In
appearing in particular districts, where a mob or a band of regulators may for a time
commit crimes and defy the law, but having every mark and attribute of a systematic,
persistent, well-defined organization, with a fixed purpose, with a regular plan of action.
"Such occurrences show that there is a preconcerted and effective plan by which
thousands of men are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The arresting
power is fettered, the witnesses are silenced, the courts are impotent, the laws are
annulled, the criminal goes free, the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress. This
condition of affairs extends to counties and States; it is, in many places, the rule,
and not the exception." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 458-59 (1871).
9 Congressional action was in response to President Grant's call for new federal
legislation to suppress the Klan. His message to Congress is found in 7 RicmuARSON,
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 127-28 (1898).
"oThe chief exponent of the Third Enforcement Act in the Senate was Senator
Edmunds of the Judiciary Committee, which reported the act. He commented as
follows regarding the purpose of the predecessor of § 333:
"When you come to the later sections, which are in aid of the first, you have the
simple and ordinary provision in the third that, when the laws are opposed, when the
courts are in danger of being unable to carry out their decrees, to arrest and punish
offenders, the executive arm is to go to their assistance, is to oppose force to force, as
is done in every city and county in the country every day, when the occassion for it
occurs, under the State laws and under national laws . . . . When force is to be
opposed to the quiet progress of the law the arm of the nation is to resist force with
force, is to gather up the offender and turn him over to the courts of justice for trial.
That is all there is to it. We are not attempting to overturn the judiciary; we are
attempting to uphold it." CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 698 (1871). (Emphasis
added.)
At another point, Mr. Edmunds stated: "[U]nder this [the third] section ... the
President and his forces really act as a posse comitatus, although they are entitled
to act under this bill just as police officers are entitled to act, as a posse comitatus,
so to speak, without a warrant; that is, the President may go in with his forces and
seize the conspirators and turbulent and wicked men who are engaged in these acts of
violence, without waiting for anybody to swear out a warrant against these people
before a commissioner or a judge. He may capture them, as we always do in such
cases. He occupies in fact, seeing the thing go on and being called upon to repress
it by force, precisely the position that a body of police would occupy in seeing a riot
[Vol. 1966: 415
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fact, the original text of section 333 contained a final clause which
directed that "any person who shall be arrested under the provisions
of this and the preceding section shall be delivered to the marshal
of the proper district, to be dealt with according to law."31
The peculiar phraseology of section 333 suggests not only
its original function as part of this statutory scheme but also the
nature of the evil which the Enforcement Acts were intended to
suppress.3 2 Certain interpretive difficulties arise when attempting
to adapt to contemporary conditions a law which was, to a large
degree, formulated to meet a circumstance of history not existent
in the streets of a city, who would seize the rioters and take them before a judge..."
to be held for trial in the federal courts for conspiracy under the preceding sections
of the same act. Id. at 567-68.
"1Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 14. The phraseology "according to
law" was interpreted to mean prosecution for violation of the preceding criminal
sections of the Enforcement Act. Senator Edmunds expressed the matter as follows:
"Then the party being brought into court would be tried under the preceding sec-
tions of this act for being engaged in a conspiracy of the nature named, and would
be tried in that case under the second and third sections in the circuit court of the
United States for that State or the district court, as the case might be, and wherever
that court should be held, instead of being tried in the very county, as always by
State laws it is provided, where the offense was committed." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.
1st Sess. 568 (1871).
This final clause relating to marshals was deleted in the first codification of § 333,
REv. STAT. § 5299 (1875), and thereafter, 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1964).
112 Military intervention in various parts of the South and suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus in nine South Carolina counties were amazingly successful in bring-
ing the Klan almost immediately under control. In April of 1872, the United States
Attorney General could report 501 arrests in South Carolina with 53 guilty pleas and 5
jury trials all resulting in convictions; while 37 persons had been convicted or pleaded
guilty and 944 were under indictment in North Carolina. H.R. ExEC. Doc. No. 268,
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1872). At the same time the District Attorney for North
Carolina reported that the power of the Klan had been broken in that state. Id. at
29-30. See RANDALL & DONALD, op. cit. supra note 27, at 684. See PROCEEDINGS IN THE
Ku KLux KLAN TRIALS AT COLUMBIA, S.C. IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT,
1871, for a portion of the record of the five jury trials, including United States v.
Mitchell, 26 Fed. Cas. 1283 (No. 15790) (C.C.D.S.C. 1871), and United States v. Crosby,
25 Fed. Cas. 701 (No. 14893) (C.C.D.S.C. 1871).
For eighty years § 333 remained buried in obscurity. It was cited in 1913 by
President Cleveland as an authority for his use of troops, over the vigorous protests of
the Governor of Illinois, in the Chicago Pullman strike of 1894. CLEVELAND, THE Gov-
ERNMENT IN TIM CmcAco STRIEs 19-20 (1913). However, the proclamation issued
at the time of the strike refer only to the execution of federal laws and protection of
federal property, making no reference to specific statutory authority. Id. at 34. Invo-
cation of § 333 was also discussed in 1908 when the Governor of Nevada requested
federal troops to suppress violence which had erupted in the course of a labor dispute.
President Theodore Roosevelt, through Secretary of State Elihu Root, insisted that
"a mere statement of domestic disturbance would not seem to be sufficient" to allow
the use of federal troops. H.R. Doc. No. 607, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1908). It may
be noted in passing that both the Pullman and Goldfield interludes involved labor
disputes, rather than violence related to racial strife.
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today. For example, the emasculation of many Reconstruction-era
statutes left federal civil rights legislation in the criminal field in
a state of some disarray at least until very recently. [The basic
statutes in the area of general criminal civil rights legislation are
sections 241 and 242 of title 18, United States Code,33 which punish
the deprivation or conspiracy to deprive persons of constitutional
rights and are both remnants of the Enforcement Acts.3 4 In addi-
318 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964).
", The demise of various elements of the Enforcement Acts commenced almost im-
mediately after their enactment. In 1914 it was stated that of forty-two sections in
the original acts only seven remained nominally in force. The others had either been
repealed, rendered obsolete, or declared unconstitutional. Davis, The Federal Enforce-
ment Acts, in STUDIES IN SouTHERN HISTORY AND Pox.rrscs 205, 228 (1914). Today, how-
ever, the century-old remnants of another era have been given renewed invigoration
by a Court much niore sympathetic than the one which initially reduced them to
inconsequential relics.
The significant sections of the Enforcement Acts still in force are the following:
(1) 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964) (formerly Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 141)
is a criminal conspiracy statute, prescribing a fine of up to $5000 and/or imprisonment
for a period of not more than ten years for conspiracy to injure any citizen in the
exercise of a federal constitutional right, or going in disguise on the highway with
intent to prevent the free exercise of such a right. This statute, by a narrow 4-1-4
decision in Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70 (1951) (Black, J., concur-
ring), was construed to protect only those rights arising from the relationship
of the individual to the federal government. This encompasses such weighty
items as the right to travel to Washington, D.C., to protection on the high
seas, and to supply arms to the federal government. See the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873). However, § 241 has recently been authoritatively
reinterpreted in a manner similar to that advocated by the dissenters in Williams.
In United States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152 (1966) the Court held that § 241 en-
compasses all federal constitutional and statutory rights, including the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of protection against deprivation by the state of life and
liberty without due process of law. Id. at 1158, 1160. In a companion case,
United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966), § 241 was interpreted to provide
redress for denial of those rights secured by the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 1175.
(2) 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964) (formerly Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 17, as amended,
REv. STAT. § 5510 (1875)), prescribes a fine or not more than $1000 and/or a prison
sentence of not more than one year for anyone who "under color of any law" willfully
subjects an inhabitant of any state to the deprivation of constitutionally secured
rights. The scienter requirement was strictly construed in Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945), in order to save the statute from the vice of vagueness. Hence, it
it must be shown that the defendant acted with the intent of violating a "consti-
tutional requirement which has been made specific and definite." Id. at 105.
In addition, the civil remedies provided by the Enforcement Acts have proved
to be ineffective, largely because of the hostile attitude of the Supreme Court.
(1) Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, as amended, Rlv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1964) provides for the accrual of a cause of action to anyone deprived by another
"under color of law" of federal constitutional rights. This statute was revived by the
decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), after a series of cases which had held
it applicable only upon a showing of racial discrimination against a particular class
and narrowly limiting the rights protected and the scope of "under color of law."
E.g., Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th
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tion, recent statutes provide criminal penalties for certain specific
actions such as interference with federal voting registrars. 35] Further-
more, it may be inaccurate to describe the contemporary situation as
one in which state and federal civil processes are effectively para-
lyzed by a massive conspiracy of such dimensions that military
force is required to maintain order and to execute the laws. To
the extent that section 333 embodies this condition precedent,
its present applicability may be somewhat more limited than the
interventionists insist upon.
Section 333 and Its Theory of Equal Protection
Because of the extremely hazardous conditions in the South re-
garding the personal safety of those of the Republican persuasion
(white and Negro) and the failure of the state governments to pro-
vide even a minimum degree of protection from violence, it is
hardly surprising that the Radical-dominated Forty-second Con-
gress considered at some length the meaning and application of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. From the
Cir. 1954); Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1953). Monroe v. Pape, supra,
held that a cause of action is stated by showing (a) a deprivation of constitutional
rights including those guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and (b) that such deprivation was effected by one holding power by
virtue of state law, even if his acts were in violation of that law. Id. at 171, 184.
(2) Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, as amended, Rv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (3) (1964), is a civil conspiracy statute, providing a cause of action to the in-
jured party upon a showing of any of the following: (a) conspiracy to deprive equal
protection of the laws; (b) conspiracy to prevent the local authorities from according
to all the equal protection of the laws; (c) conspiracy to prevent a legal voter from
giving lawful support to candidates for federal office; (d) or, in each of the above
situations, persons having gone on the highway in disguise or on another's premises
to effect the stated end. The important and broadly phrased provision for deprivation
of equal protection was rendered impotent in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651
(1951). See note 23 supra.
(3) Finally, there is Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, as amended, REv. STAT.
§ 1977 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), based upon § 1 of the original Civil Rights Act
of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, which declares that everyone shall have equal rights in
each state to sue in its courts, make contracts and enjoy equal protection for the
security of person and property.
"Voting Rights Act of 1965, §§ 11, 12, 79 Stat. 443, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973i-j (Supp.
1965) (interference with the exercise of the right to vote or official duties required
to be performed by the statute). See also Civil Rights Act of 1960, § 101, 18 U.S.C. §
1509 (1964) (interference with the exercise of rights under a federal court decree);
Civil Rights Act of 1960, §§ 201-03, 18 U.S.C. §§ 837, 1074 (1964) (flight to avoid
prosecutions for damaging or destroying any building or other real or personal property;
threats or false information concerning attempts to damage or destroy real or personal
property by fire or explosives).
Numerous proposals have been made for the strengthening of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42
(1964), and the replacement of these statutes with comprehensive federal criminal
legislation. See note 155 and note 166 infra and accompanying text.
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congressional debates emerges a view espoused by speakers for the
majority which places great emphasis upon a concept of protection
to be afforded by the state. Briefly stated, the theory is that the
state is required by the equal protection clause to extend the pro-
tection of equal laws to all of its inhabitants; should it fail or re-
fuse to do so, Congress may step in by virtue of section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment to extend that protection which the state
has denied.36 Although there were divergent views as to the
details of interpretation and application of this theory, the fol-
lowing general outlines of the concept of "protection" embodied
in section 333 emerge from the congressional debates:
1. "It is a fundamental principle of law that while the citizen
owes allegiance to the Government he has a right to expect and de-
mand protection for life, person, and property."3 7
2. The great objective of the equal protection clause is that the
protection of government be extended equally to all persons within
the jurisdiction of the respective states.38
3. The command that the state shall not deny equal protection
of the laws means that the state shall not withhold or fail to afford
such protection. That is to say, the phraseology "no State shall
deny" is the equivalent of "each State shall afford."3 9
4. Hence, acts of omission by the state, as well as acts of com-
mission, may violate the equal protection clause. In particular,
if a state has sufficient laws to safeguard the fundamental rights
of person and property, but is prevented from or refuses to execute
such laws, then this amounts to an effective denial of equal pro-
tection.40
So This is the argument basically relied upon by the Justice Department in Alabama
v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963). See Brief for Defendants, p. 9.
" CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1871) (remarks of Representative Stough-
ton). See HARuus, THE QUEST FOR EQuALrr 1-28 (1960), where the notion of protec-
tion by the government is developed as a basic concept of Western political theory.
The author then considers this theme as embodied in the equal protection clause
and its interpretation in the constitutional history of that clause. Id. at 24-158.
38 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 182 (1871) (remarks of Representative
Mercur).
"Id. at 514 (remarks of Representative Poland); id. at app. 80 (remarks of Repre-
sentative Perry); id. at 608 (remarks of Senator Pool); id. at 251 (remarks of Senator
Morton); id. at app. 71 (remarks of Representative Shellabarger); id. at 481 (remarks
of Representative Wilson); id. at 501 (remarks of Senator Frelinghuysen).
"0Id. at 482 (remarks of Representative Wilson); id. at 459 (remarks of Repre-
sentative Coburn); id. at 501 (remarks of Senator Frelinghuysen); id. at 608 (remarks
of Senator Pool); id. at app. 800 (remarks of Representative Stevenson); id. at app.
182 (remarks of Representative Mercur).
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5. On the other hand, infrequent violations of state laws, for
which the state provides a reasonable remedy, do not indicate state
infringement of the equal protection clause.41 Since it is unrealistic
to suppose that all criminals will be apprehended or that the punish-
ment inflicted will satisfy everyone, so it is that the distinction
here made may in some cases become a matter of controversy.42
Nevertheless, as the Radicals viewed the situation in 1871, the
inadequacy of the southern governments to cope with disorder was
painfully apparent and beyond question.
6. When the state fails to extend the equal protection of the
laws, Congress may enact "appropriate legislation" by virtue of
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment in order to guarantee such
protection.4 3  It is at this point that a division on the theoretical
level appeared in Republican ranks. The phrase "when the state
fails" suggests the point of view of the more moderate Republicans
that Congress could only provide for federal action if it were con-
ditioned upon a precedent denial of equal protection by the state.
On the other hand, the Radicals contended that section 5 was an
affirmative grant of power to enact legislation relating to the guaran-
tees of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment whether or not the
states were adequately complying with the injunctions of sec-
tion 1.44 The distinction was somewhat academic in 1871, for all
11 Id. at 514 (remarks of Representative Poland); id. at 697 (remarks of Senator
Edmunds); id. at app. 153 (remarks of Representative Garfield); cf. id. at 333-34
(remarks of Representative Hoar in discussion of article IV, § 4 of the Constitution,
guaranteeing a republican form of government).
12 Under § 333 as enacted the determination as to when deterioration of state law
enforcement efforts reaches such a point as to constitute a denial of equal protection
in terms of paragraph 1 of § 333 is to be made by the President. See text accompanying
notes 135-43 infra.
" Id. at 514 (remarks of Representative Poland); id. at app. 182 (remarks of Repre-
sentative Mercur); id. at 608 (remarks of Senator Pool); id. at app. 300 (remarks of Rep-
resentative Stevenson); id. at app. 251 (remarks of Senator Morton); id. at 459 (re-
marks of Representative Coburn); id. at 501 (remarks of Senator Frelinghuysen);
id. at 506 (remarks of Senator Pratt); id. at app. 71 (remarks of Representative Shella-
barger); id. at 482 (remarks of Representative Wilson).
" See HAIuus, op. cit. supra note 37, at 45-49; Frantz, Congressional Power to En-
force the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YAit LJ. 1353, 1358 (1964).
Representative Garfield discussed extensively the power of Congress under the four-
teenth amendment. He compared the scope of § 1 with a version which the Thirty-
ninth Congress had rejected: "'Congress shall have power to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property."' CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 150 (1871).
Discussing the differing phraseology, Garfield continued: "The one [§ 1 as adopted]
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Republicans could agree that the southern states were indeed deny-
ing the equal protection of the laws.
7. Finally, the Radicals were agreed that it was impractical
to the point of futility to enact legislation punishing the states for
failure to adhere to the requirements of section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment. The basic difficulty was that the states had been ren-
dered powerless to act. Hence the Enforcement Acts, including
section 333, were directed against the activities of individuals.45
exerts its force directly upon the States, laying restrictions and limitations upon their
power and enabling Congress to enforce these limitations. The other, the rejected
proposition, would have brought the power of Congress to bear directly upon the
citizens, and contained a clear grant of power to Congress to legislate directly for the
protection of life, liberty, and property within the States." Id. at app. 151. Hence it
follows that Congress may not directly legislate with respect to "life, liberty, and
property," but may only step in to correct a precedent constitutional denial by the
state. See Garfield's remarks, id. at app. 153.
Compare the views of the more radical Representative Bingham: "These last
amendments-thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth-do, in my judgment, vest in Con-
gress a power to protect the rights of citizens against States, and individuals in
States, never before granted. . . . The power to enforce this provision [§ 1] by law
is as full as any other grant of power to Congress. . . . Mr. Speaker, this House may
safely ... [pass] laws for enforcing all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, as guarantied by the amended Constitution and expressly enumerated in
the Constitution. . . . 'The Government owes high and solemn duties to every citizen
of the country. It is bound to protect him in his most important rights.' [Quoting
Daniel Webster.] Has he rights any more important than the rights of life, liberty,
and property? . .. It is clear that if Congress do so provide by penal laws for the
protection of these rights, those violating them must answer for the crime, and not
the States: The United States punishes men, not States, for a violation of its laws."
Id. at app. 83-86.
"'Id. at 506 (remarks of Senator Pratt); id. at app. 251 (remarks of Senator
Morton); id. at 608 (remarks of Senator Pool); id. at 514 (remarks of Representative
Poland); id. at 459 (remarks of Representative Coburn); id. at 691 (remarks of
Senator Edmunds).
Of course, the outnumbered Democrats vigorously dissented from the view of
their Radical brethren on the issue of the effect of §§ 1 and 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. They argued alternatively that § 1 was a limitation upon the power
of the states only, that § 5 authorizing "appropriate legislation" applied only to
§§ 2, 3, and 4 of the amendment, and that in any event § 1 only proscribed state
action in the form of discriminatory legislative enactments. See, e.g., id. at 455 (re-
marks of Representative Cox); id. at 572-73 (remarks of Senator Stockton); id. at
app. 48 (remarks of Representative Kerr); id. at app. 115 (remarks of Representative
Farnsworth); id. at app. 117 (remarks of Senator Blair); id. at app. 208 (remarks of
Representative Blair); id. at app. 259 (remarks of Representative Holman); id. at
app. 315 (remarks of Representative Burchard).
In maintaining their respective positions, both Radicals and Democrats appealed to
the proceedings of the Thirty-ninth Congress which had passed both the Civil Rights
Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), and the fourteenth amendment. Unfortunately, §§ I
and 5 of the amendment were not extensively debated nor their full implications
drawn out because of congressional preoccupation with other sections, particularly
§ 2, which dealt with reduction of state representation in the House of Representatives
in proportion to the number of potential voters whose right to vote is abridged.
Nevertheless, there was considerable support for the Democratic view. See CONG.
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The Constitutionality of Section 333
Early cases in the lower federal courts lent considerable support to
the Radical Republican view of the fourteenth amendment outlined
above in regard both to the plenary power of Congress to act prior
to any state neglect of its constitutional duties and to congressional
action directed against individuals.48  However, the Supreme Court,
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (remarks of Senator Howard); id. at 2459
(remarks of Representative Stevens); HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 37, at 36-37. On
the other hand, the language of Representative Bingham, principal author of § 1
of the fourteenth amendment, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866), Repre-
sentative Farnsworth, id. at 2539, and Representative Poland, id. at 2961, suggests the
possibility of a broader interpretation. The Thirty-ninth Congress also passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, which was inexplicitly enshrined in § 1
of the fourteenth amendment. See HARRIs, op. cit. supra note 37, at 40. In the debates
on this act, references to protection for life and property from violence were not
uncommon. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866) (remarks of Senator
Trumbull); id. at 1118-19, 1294 (remarks of Representative Wilson); id. at 1152 (re-
marks of Senator Thayer); id. at 1159 (remarks of Representative Windon); id. at
1262-63 (remarks of Representative Broomall); id. at 1293 (remarks of Representative
Shellabarger); id. at 1832 (remarks of Representative Lawrence). Thus, while the
germ of the "protection" notion may be contained in the debates of the Thirty-ninth
Congress, the concept did not appear fully developed until the discussions concerning
the Enforcement Acts. The newly explored implications of the fourteenth amendment
produced various cries of anguish, including the following from Representative Storm
of Pennsylvania: "If the monstrous doctrine now set up as resulting from the provisions
of that Fourteenth Amendment had even been hinted at that Amendment would have
received an emphatic rejection at the hands of the people." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
Ist Sess. app. 87 (1871).
Of course, it might be argued that the interpretation which the Forty-second
Congress placed upon the fourteenth amendment is fully authoritative, for the com-
positions of the Thirty-ninth and Forty-second Congresses were similar, both in-
cluding such influential members as Representatives Bingham, Garfield and Shella-
barger. However, the weight given to this factor must be reduced by the extent to
which the views of both Republicans and Democrats varied with the political ad-
vantage sought to be gained. In particular, Democrats opted for an expansive
interpretation and Republicans a more moderate one prior to the ratification of the
fourteenth amendment. After the final approval of that amendment, the roles tended
to become reversed. See MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER
119-20 (1963).
40 For example, in United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79 (No. 15282) (C.C.S.D.
Ala. 1871), Judge Woods, who ironically was later to write the opinion in United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), which severely restricted congressional power
under the fourteenth amendment, aptly summarized the theory of the Enforcement
Acts: "[C]ongress has the power, by appropriate legislation, to protect the funda-
mental rights of citizens of the United States against unfriendly or insufficient state
legislation, for the fourteenth amendment not only prohibits the making or enforcing
of laws which shall abridge the privileges of the citizen, but prohibits the states
from denying to all persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Denying includes inaction aswell as action, and denying the equal protection of the
laws includes the omission to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for pro-
tection .... [TMo guard against the invasion of the citizen's fundamental rights, and
to ensure their adequate protection, as well against state legislation as state inaction,
or incompetency, the amendment gives congress the power to enforce its provisions by
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in a series of devastating decisions which included United States v.
Reese,47 United States v. Cruikshank,48 United States v. Harris,4
and the Civil Rights Cases,50 narrowly circumscribed congressional
power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment by imposing
a strict concept of "state action" upon section I of that amend-
ment, thereby creating the dichotomy between "state action" and
"individual action." This appeared to undercut the most effective
application of congressional power-action directly against indi-
viduals whose illegal activities the state did not control.51 Thus
arose the notion that the fourteenth amendment finds application
only against certain action of the states. At first glance, this inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment may seem to cast doubt upon
the constitutionality of section 333 insofar as the statute purports
to authorize federal action against individuals. However, section
833 is somewhat unusual, for the statute assumes that state inaction
to assure equal protection is violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment,52 and in that context measures are authorized against indi-
viduals. The Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider a
statute interpreted in this precise manner;5 3 however, the line of
Supreme Court cases narrowly construing congressional power under
the fourteenth amendment by no means excludes application of
that amendment to mixed'situations involving "state action" and
"private action. '54 It remains, then, to consider whether "state
appropriate legislation. And as it would be unseemly for congress to interfere directly
with state enactments, and as it cannot compel the activity of state officials, the only
appropriate legislation it can make is that which will operate directly on offenders
and offenses .... " United States v. Hall, supra at 81. (Emphasis added.)
In addition, see Ex parte Riggins, 184 Fed. 404 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904); United
States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. 1324 (No. 15210) (C.C.D. Del. 1878); United States
v. Mall, 26 Fed. Gas. 1147 (No. 15712) (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871); United States v. Blackburn,
24 Fed. Gas. 1158 (No. 14603) (D.C.W.D. Mo. 1874).
17 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
892 U.S. 542 (1876).
"106 U.S. 629 (1883).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
See text accompanying note 45 supra.
The following colloquy took place between Representatives Farnsworth and
Shellabarger:
"MR. FARNSWORTH: The third section [predecessor of § 333] makes no ref.
erence to the unconstitutional acts of a State. It refers to the unlawful acts of a
combination of two or more persons.
"MR. SHELLABARGER: No; it assumes that the State has denied protection to
some of its citizens." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 116 (1871).
51 See Frantz, supra note 44, at 1359.
11 Ibid. The older Supreme Court cases emphasized that congressional enactments
had attempted to regulate individual conduct and were not conditioned upon a
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action" is present in the section 833 situation 5 and whether the
precedent denial of constitutional rights by the states. For example, in United States
v. Harris, which declared unconstitutional a federal statute [REv. STAT. § 5519 (1875),
see note 23 supra] punishing conspiracy to deprive equal protection of the laws, the
Court stated: "When the State has been guilty of no violation of its [the fourteenth
amendment's] provisions; when it has not made or enforced any law abridging the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; when no one of its de-
partments has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, or denied to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws; when, on the contrary, the laws of the State, as enacted by its legislative and
construed by its judicial, and administered by its executive departments, recognize
and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no duty and confers
no power upon Congress." 106 U.S. at 639. (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in the Civil Rights Cases the Court stated that punishment of the mere
"wrongful act of an individual" unsupported by state authority in the form of laws,
customs, judicial or executive procedures was not within the reach of congressional
power under the fourteenth amendment. The Court assumed that the victim's "rights
remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of
the State for redress." 109 U.S. at 17. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 661
(1951). The Court complained that the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat.
335, "does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by
the States; it does not make its operation to depend upon any such wrong committed.
It'applies equally to cases arising in States which have the justest laws respecting the
personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such
laws, as to those which arise in States which may have violated the prohibition of
the amendment. In other words, it steps into the domain of local jurisprudence,
and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals in society towards each other, and
imposes sanctions for the enforcement of those rules, without referring in any manner
to any supposed action of the State or its authorities." 109 U.S. at 14.
The rationale in these cases hardly speaks to the issue of congressional power in
the instance in which the state falls or refuses to safeguard the victims' rights in
violation of the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment. In Ex parte Riggins, 134
Fed. 404 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904), writ quashed sub noma. Riggins v. United States, 199
U.S. 547 (1905), Harris and the Civil Rights Cases were explained in the following
manner: "It was the plenary power of Congress over state laws and state officers, when
the state was not at fault, and not the auxiliary power of Congress or its right
to punish individuals who prevented the enjoyment of a right secured to the citizen
under the Constitution and laws of the United States, which was there involved and
decided." Ex parte Riggins, supra at 415. (Emphasis added.)
15 The presence of "state action" in a § 333 situation depends in part upon
whether the conditions set forth in the statute are within the scope of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause, or at least that Congress may so determine under
§ 5. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rdle of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. Rav. 543, 558-60
(1954). The Supreme Court has occasionally hinted that the equal protection clause
may indeed require that a certain minimal level of protection be afforded by the
state governments. For example, in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884), the
Court stated that the clause intended that "equal protection and security should be
given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil
rights .... " Id. at 31. And again, "the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of
the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
(Emphasis added.) In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), the Court bound the
due process and equal protection clauses together, commenting that the former secured
"a required minimum of protection for everyone's right of life, liberty, and property,
which the Congress or the legislature may not withhold." Id. at 332. The equal
protection clause then guarantees that this "minimum of protection" will be enjoyed
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measures which it authorizes against individuals are "appropriate
legislation" in terms of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.50
We may begin with the elementary observation that the "state
action" requirement has been seriously eroded in recent years.57
on a non-discriminatory basis. More recently, in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),
the Court, in requiring that indigent defendants be given a free transcript of their
trial for purposes of appeal, established a minimum standard of treatment for those
criminally accused. See HARRIs, op. cit. supra note 37, at 78-81.
More frequently, however, the Court has focused upon the aspect of equality,
holding that in the applications of its laws the state may not "invidiously discriminate"
against individuals or classes thereof. E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (finding no invidious discrimina-
tion); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (same); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
For many purposes with respect to § 333 it may make little difference which
analysis is adopted. Clearly, for example, if uncontrolled violence should erupt in
one area of a state, protection has been denied in the sense discussed by the Forty-
second Congress. However, to the extent that a state maintains order in one portion
of its territory and is unwilling to do so in another part, there is surely an "invidious
discrimination" against the victims of the rampant violence. A case could conceivably
arise, however, in which the state failed to afford protection on a large scale as the
result of a serious impairment of governmental processes. In such an instance there
would be no "invidious discrimination" and appeal to the "required minimum of pro-
tection" would necessarily have to be made. It is hardly likely, however, should such
an extreme condition arise, that much notice would be taken of the legal subtleties
of the situation.
" This discussion is focused upon the fourteenth amendment because it was
envisaged by the Forty-second Congress as the constitutional authority for the
enactment of § 333 and because the Supreme Court has recently reconsidered
the scope of congressional power to enforce that amendment. See notes 62-69
infra and accompanying text. It must be mentioned, however, that the four-
teenth amendment need not be the exclusive source of congressional power in
the field of civil rights legislation. For example, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.), was bottomed and
upheld on the basis of the commerce power alone. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Considering the broad scope which has traditionally been assigned to the comemrce
power, it is hardly arguable that Congress could not provide for federal intervention
to keep open those channels of commerce which would assuredly be adversely affected
by violence on the scale contemplated by § 333. In fact, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated in sweeping language that federal power pursuant to the commerce clause
may be exerted against obstructions to interstate commerce even in the absence of
congressional statute. Thus, in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), the Court stated:
"The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of the land
the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security of all rights en-
trusted by the Constitution to its care. The strong arm of the national government
may be put forth to brush away all obstructions to the freedom of interstate com-
merce or the transportation of the mails. If the emergency arises, the arm of the
Nation and all its militia, are at the service of the nation to compel obedience to its
laws." Id. at 582. (Emphasis added.) See United States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Ku
Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897, 901-04 (M.D. Ala. 1961). See generally Burke, The
Civil Rights Uses of In Re Debs, I LAw IN TRANSITION Q. 139 (1964).
5TSee, e.g., Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 43 CoR.u.aL L.Q. 375 (1962); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes
for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962);Karst & Van Alstyne, Comment:
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For example, in Lombard v. Louisiana58 the mere statement of the
mayor and superintendent of police expressing disenchantment
with sit-in demonstrations and stating the intention to enforce
Louisiana's neutral trespass law against the demonstrators was
sufficient to constitute "state action" 59 and a violation of the equal
protection clause. The demonstrators' convictions for criminal mis-
chief (trespass) in refusing to leave a restaurant were therefore over-
turned.60
Sit-Ins and State Action-Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REv. 762 (1962);
Morse, Policy and the Fourteenth Amendment: A New Semantics, 27 FoRDHAf L. Racv.
187 (1958); St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action,
Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MicH. L. REv. 993 (1961);
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv. 347 (1963); Note, 96 U. PA.
L. REv. 402 (1948).
For the view that the concept of "state action" has not been "expanded," see
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Manning, State
Responsibility Under the Fourteenth Amendment: An Adherence to Tradition, 27
FoRDnAm L. REv. 201 (1958).
Some commentators maintain that the traditional concept is essentially useless
and should be discarded. See Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial
Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CALrF. L. REv. 1 (1964); Horowitz, The Mis-
leading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv.
208 (1957); Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman
of State Action, 1965 DuKE L.J. 219; Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L.
REv. 3 (1961).
-8 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
"The Court said that because of the mayor's statement the city of New
Orleans must be treated "exactly as if" it had an ordinance requiring segregation
in eating establishments. Id. at 273. By making this identification, the Court was able
to dispose of the case on the authority of Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963), thus eliminating the necessity for a re-examination of the "state action"
problem. The Court finally disposed of one portion of the sit-in cases in Hamm v.
City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), 1965 DuKE L.J. 640, holding that the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42
U.S.C.), abated state "sit-in" convictions which involved facilities covered by the act.
60It was formerly thought that the state had to initiate or be intimately in-
volved with discriminatory activity to run afoul of the fourteenth amendment.
Thus, Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Peterson v.
City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), stated: "The ultimate substantive question
is whether there has been 'State action of a particular character' (Civil Rights Cases,
. . . [109 U.S. at 11] . . .)-whether the character of the State's involvement in an
arbitrary discrimination is such that it should be held responsible for the discrimina-
tion." Peterson v. City of Greenville, supra at 249. (Emphasis in original.) Or, again,
"the Equal Protection Clause reaches only discriminations that are the product of
capricious state action; it does not touch discriminations whose origins and effectuation
arise solely out of individual predilections, prejudice, and acts. Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 316 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
There are indications, however, that it makes no difference that a state applies
its laws with an even hand indiscriminately to all. In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964), three of the six-man majority felt that such applications of the state's neutral
trespass law resulted in an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection in a sit-in
situation. At least one state case, State v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379 (Del. 1963), has so
held. Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct.
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Modern Supreme Court cases, such as Lombard, have dealt with
section 1 of the fourteenth amendment as a judicially-enforced,
self-executing limitation upon the states. However, a distinction
has sometimes been drawn between the reach of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment unaided by statute and the broader power
of Congress under section 5 of that amendment."1 Nevertheless, be-
cause Congress has not attempted to base legislation upon this sec-
tion since the overthrow of the civil rights acts in the 1870's, few
contemporary definitions of congressional power are available. How-
ever, some cases62 and commentators suggest an expansive inter-
1170 (1966), suggests by way of dicta that this view expressed in Bell may now
command a majority of the Court. Reference is made to the "co-operative private
and state action . . . involved in Bell." Id. at 1177. However, in the preceding
paragraph Mr. Justice Stewart had pointed out that the Court had found "state
action" violative of the equal protection clause in situations in which "the
participation of the State was peripheral, or its action was only one of several
co-operative forces leading to the constitutional violations." Ibid. This con-
troversy as to "the threshold level that state dction must attain in order to create
rights under the Equal Protection Clause," ibid., is, of course, a direct outgrowth of
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
61 For example, the dissent of Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Harlan and
White, in Bell v. Maryland, supra note 60, indicates that § 1 as a self-executing re-
striction upon the states defined by the judiciary is limited to "state action," but that
the power of Congress under § 5 is not so limited, thus opening the way for legis-
lation directed against individuals. Id. at 326 & n.11. See Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice
Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 DusE L.J. 219,
222. This notion that the power of Congress is more extensive than that of the
judiciary is also expressed in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in United
States v. Guest, supra note 60, at 1191-92. Mr. Justice Brennan points out that the
framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to augment the power of Congress
and not that of the judiciary. Congress was viewed as the body most able to fashion
procedures for the implementation of fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 1191 & n.7.
'2See Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831
(1951); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 776 (1947); Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943); United States
v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (EMD. La. 1963), aff"d, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); cases cited
note 46 supra.
In the recent case of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the
Supreme Court in upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), had occasion to interpret § 2 of the fifteenth amend-
ment which is in terms virtually identical to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court stated that "the basic test to be applied .. . is the same as in all cases con-
cerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the
States." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra at 326. The Court then adopted as a
statement of that test the following classic pronouncement of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819): "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra at 326. A similar position with respect to § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment is taken by Mr. Justice Brennan in United States v. Guest,
supra note 60, at 1191-92 (separate opinion).
[Vol. 1966: 415
FEDERAL INTERVENTION
pretation of section 5 clearly broad enough to bring within its scope
activities of individuals which contribute to the deprivation of four-
teenth amendment rights when the state itself does not protect those
rights. 3
Perhaps the most significant recent decision in this connection
is United States v. Guest,64 involving the construction of section 241
of title 18, United States Code,65 which prescribes punishment for
conspiracy to injure any citizen in his enjoyment of federal consti-
tutional or statutory rights.66 In particular the separate opinion of
Mr. Justice Brennan concludes that section 5 must be interpreted
with the same latitude as any other express power of Congress and
that "Congress is thus fully empowered to determine that punish-
ment of private conspiracies interfering with the exercise of ...
[fourteenth amendment rights] is necessary to . . . [their] full pro-
tection." 67 Similar views, though less fully developed, were stated
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra at 818, Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1880) is cited with approval. The latter case contains some interesting language
concerning what constitutes "appropriate legislation" under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment:
"It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged [by § 5]. Congress is au-
thorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is
contemplated to make the amendments fully effective. Whatever legislation is ap-
propriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view,
whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to
secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought
within the domain of congressional power." Ex parte Virginia, supra at 345-46.
(Emphasis in original.)
There is, other more restrictive language in the opinion: "The prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree
restrictions of State power. It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to
enforce against State action, however put forth, whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial." Id. at 346. (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the Court
is contemplating "state action" as consisting only of positive actions of governmental
officials. When it is conceded that non-action is also state action for fourteenth
amendment purposes (see notes 70-73 infra and accompanying text) then the scope of
"appropriate legislation" must necessarily be reconsidered.
"' See, e.g., HARRis, op. cit. supra note 37; Frank & Munro, The Original Under-
standing of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUm. L. REv. 131 (1950); Frantz,
supra note 44; Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAW. GuiLD REv. 627 (1946);
Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 303 (1959); Roche,
Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. CHi. L. Rav. 103, 107-12 (1963); Van
Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action,
1965 Duocx LJ. 219. See generally MAGRATH, op. cit. supra note 45, at 116-34.
0186 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966).
" 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
00 See note 34 supra.
17 86 Sup. Ct. at 1191. (Emphasis added.)
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by Mr. Justice Clark in his concurring opinion.," Thus a broad in-
terpretation of section 5 apparently commands a majority of the
Court. 69
Of course, the constitutionality of section 333 by no means
depends upon a circumvention of the "state action" doctrine,70 for
68Id. at 1180.
" United States v. Guest produced four opinions, Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion for
the )Court, Mr. Justice Clark's concurrence, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, Mr.
Justice Brennan's separate opinion, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr.
Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Harlan's separate opinion.
Prior to the Guest case Justices Douglas and Goldberg had been particularly
vigorous in urging the Court to adopt an expansive interpretation of § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. These Justices essentially espoused the Radical view that
Congress may act directly upon individuals in relation to § 1 rights whether or not
the states are adequately protecting those rights. See note 44 supra and accompanying
text. Douglas and Goldberg would have placed congressional authority to enact the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.),
squarely upon § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 279-80 (Douglas, J., concurring), 293 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring). (These respective concurrences were also made applicable to Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).) Douglas and Goldberg reiterated their views in
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 317 (1964).
Thus it is now possible to interpret the views of virtually all of the Justices as
indicating that congressional power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment is not
limited by traditional "state action" concepts. Under this interpretation, the search
for "state action" in the § 333 situation is unnecessary.
7o There are a few ways of making an end run around the "state action" obstacle
without directly seeking its demise. For example, in Congress of Racial Equality v.
Clemmons, 323 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 992 (1964), the court
stated that there were "two major exceptions" to the state action requirement of the
fourteenth amendment and described them as follows: "As pointed out in Collins v.
Hardyman, one exception is a massive conspiracy such as the Klan in Reconstruction
days, 'so far flung and embracing such members * * [as] to deprive Negroes of their
legal rights and to dose all avenues of redress or vindication.' . . . [341 U.S. 651, 662
(1951)].... The other exception applies when private persons take over governmental
functions." [Citations omitted.] Congress of Racial Equality v. Clemmons, supra at
62-63.
Unfortunately, this is not a promising approach. In the first place it is limited
to the "massive conspiracy." Secondly, reliance upon Collins v. Hardyman, supra,
is misplaced, for the dicta in that case indicate that grave constitutional problems
would arise even if the statute were applied to individuals comprising a "massive con-
spiracy." Note 23 supra. Collins, of course, predates the new burst of enthusiasm
shown by the Court for civil rights actions. This era commenced with Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See note 34 supra.
A somewhat novel approach is taken in Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d
91 (8th Cir. 1956), 43 VA. L. REv. 255 (1957), in which school officials, duty bound to
accord equal protection in their operation of schools, were held to have a federal right
to be free from interference by private individuals in the performance of this duty.
Accordingly, an injunction was granted against such private individuals. The court
did not disclose all the characteristics of this "federal right," but it is apparently in the
nature of a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship, arising as it does from
the relation between the individual and the federal government. Specifically, the
cases cited by the court in Brewer describing other such analogous federal rights fall
into this category of privileges and immunities, which means in addition that Congress
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it does in fact assume the existence of "state action" 71-albeit of a
particular variety, which may perhaps more accurately be labeled
"state non-action." The Supreme Court has held that non-action
may indeed amount to "state action" for fourteenth amendment
purposes.72 Further, cases in the courts of appeals have produced
factual situations more directly relevant to that which would be en-
countered in connection with section 333. Specifically, it has been
held that the equal protection clause was violated when state officers
failed to protect persons in their custody from mob violence.73
could probably legislate to protect the exercise of this new federal right. Cases cited
by the court include United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (right to vote and
have vote counted in congressional election); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) (right
to inform marshal of federal law violation); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263
(1892) (right of one under federal confinement to be protected against violence); Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (right to vote in federal election); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876) (right to assemble peaceably to petition Congress
for redress of grievances); Anderson v. United States, 269 Fed. 65 (9th Cir. 1920), cert.
denied, 255 U.S. 576 (1921) (right to furnish federal government with war materiel).
Compare the remarks of Representative Poland: "When the State has provided the
law, and has provided the officer to carry out the law, then we have the right to say
that anybody who undertakes to interfer and prevent the execution of the State
law is amenable to this provision of the Constitution [the equal protection clause]
and to the law that we may make under it declaring it to be an offense against the
United States." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 514 (1871).
Even should this prove to be an acceptable analysis, there is still the major
problem in connection with its application to § 333 situations in that this approach
assumes that state officials desire to exercise a "federal right" but are being prevented
from doing so. However, the vast majority, if not all, of the instances in recent years
in connection with which § 333 has been discussed.have involved situations in which
it was desired to intervene in spite of, and not by invitation of, state and local
officials.
71 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
7OBurton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Therein the
Court said: "But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either
ignoring them or merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may be.... By
its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself a party
to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige
behind the admitted discrimination." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 725. See the dis-
cussion by Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 310-11
(1964), citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
It has been said, Williams, supra note 57, at 363, that non-action as violative of the
fourteenth amendment was established in Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S.
587 (1926), wherein the Court stated that "property may be as effectively taken by a
long-continued and unreasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates as by
an express affirmance of them ...." Id. at 591.
The reapportionment cases, the most prominent of which are Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), also present a species of state
"inaction" held to be in violation of the equal protection clause.
73 In Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943), the court held that
"since the failure of Catlette to protect the victims from group violence or to arrest
the members of the mob who assaulted the victims constituted a violation of his
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If, then, culpable state inaction in failing to protect its inhabi-
tants from violence may be deemed a denial under the equal pro-
tection clause, it only remains to be seen if the means employed by
section 33-action directly against individuals, 7 4 and not merely
legislation directed against recalcitrant state officials-may be con-
stitutionally sustained as "reasonably necessary to protect a right
created by and arising under"75 the fourteenth amendment.
It may be that in the case of isolated incidents involving no more
than very localized violence the "appropriate legislation" would
punish the culpable failure of the state official to do his duty.70
common law duty [to protect a prospective victim from an assault or illegal restraint
in the officer's presence], his dereliction in this respect comes squarely within the
provisions of . . . [18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964)].
"It is true that a denial of equal protection has hitherto been largely confined to
affirmative acts of discrimination. The Supreme Court, however, has already taken
the position that culpable official State inaction may also constitute a denial of equal
protection." Catlette v. United States, supra at 907. (Emphasis added.)
Almost precisely the same language as in the second quoted paragraph is found in
Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476, 479-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831
(1951). Both cases cite as authority McCabe v. Atcheson T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151
(1914), in which the Court held that if railroads under state authority supplied
sleeping or other facilities for whites, they must do likewise for Negroes, the failure
to do so constituting a denal of equal protection; and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), in which the Court held that the establishment of a law
school for whites and the failure to do so for Negroes was a denial of equal protec-
tion. Of course, the Court did not hold that the state had an affirmative duty either
to provide sleeping facilities on railroads or legal training facilities. The failure to act
(nonaction) was a denial of equal protection only after the state had granted these
advantages to particular portions of the population.
Lynch v. United States, supra, also refers to the broad language of Mr. Justice
Rutledge's concurrence in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 126 (1945), wherein the
Justice said that the rights protected by 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964) are "the rights
to a fair trial, including freedom from sham trials; to be free from arrest and deten-
tion by methods constitutionally forbidden and from extortion of property by such
methods; from extortion of confessions; from mob action incited or shared by state
officers; from failure to furnish police protection on proper occasion and demand ..
Screws v. United States, supra at 126. (Emphasis added.)
See Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
776 (1947).
"'In this connection, we have already considered some of the authorities, notes
61-63 supra and accompanying text, dealing with the issue of a broad interpretation
of the congressional grant of power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, one
which would reach the conduct of individuals. We have also concluded that Supreme
Court cases are not in opposition when there is identifiable "state action," notes 53-54
supra and accompanying text.
15 United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. at 1191 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
"'See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Lynch v. United States, 189
F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 831 (1951); Picking v. Pennsylvania
R.R, 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); Catlette v.
United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
Any private individuals acting in concert with the state official may also be
reached by Congress. See United States v. Price, 86 Sup. Ct. 1152, 1156-57 (1966); text
accompanying note 67 supra.
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However, the situation contemplated by section 333 is characterized
by widespread and uncontrolled violence. Therefore, unless statu-
tory provisions for punishment of state officials impel said officials
to take action to suppress the violence (which, after all, may be
beyond their control77), this gesture would be patently futile and
possibly unfair. It is hardly clear how incarceration or other pen-
alties imposed upon state officials for dereliction of duty will tend
to halt rioting occurring in the streets. The choice then is not
between "appropriate" legislation reaching only state officials and
"inappropriate" legislation directed against individual conduct.
Rather, the choice is between "appropriate legislation" to effectuate
the objectives, prohibitions, and guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment on the one hand, and what may be totally ineffective
legislation on the other.
If it be insisted that an alternative analysis be provided which
does not so readily dispose of "state action" in the enforcement
stage of section 333, the following may be suggested. To the extent
that the state through any of its officials is in complicity with or
encourages a mob, rioters or conspirators, it is hardly difficult to
denominate the action of the "mob" as "state action," or as the in-
strumentality by which the state is denying equal protection.78 If
this approach sounds even vaguely farfetched, it need only be re-
called that in Lombard v. Louisiana79 the mere statement of sym-
pathy by the mayor for besieged local restaurateurs and of intention
to apply a neutral trespass law against the demonstrators constituted
the prohibited denial of equal protection.
The more difficult case, however, arises in the event that the
"mob" without complicity wrests control from local authorities who
are rendered powerless to suppress it.s° How can the "mob" then
77 Violative "state action" in the situation where violence is beyond the control of
state functionaries may be said to be the failure to call upon the federal government
for assistance on the theory that the state is required in any event to provide the
protection of the laws. The original House version of § 333 contained a reference
to this effect. See note 121 infra. If the state does enlist federal aid, we are then
likely dealing with the circumstances covered by 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1964), see note 4 supra.
18 Consider the factual situations in the cases cited in note 76 supra.
711373 U.S. 267 (1963). See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
80 Here we are concerned with the very narrow situation involving rebellion
against state authority, with the presumption that the state does not call upon the
federal government for aid pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1964) (note 4 supra). If
federal law is interfered with, there is ample authority under 10 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333 (2)
(note 4 supra) to support federal intervention. This latter situation, of course, does
not involve the "state action" problem.
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be considered a state instrumentality?81 It could be argued that the
fourteenth amendment places restrictions upon "the state," which
may be defined in terms of that governmental mechanism exercising
a monopoly of political power within its sphere of competence. 2
To the extent that the "mob" wrests territorial control from the
governmental authorities, it is arguable that it invades this province
of the state and, acting in loco reipublicae, displaces the state organs
as political "sovereign."8' 3 The prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment would then operate directly upon the "mob";8 4 which
virtually by definition may be considered to have breached its con-
stitutional duty of equal protection, and may be acted upon through
federal legislation such as section 333.85
81 For an argument that an analogous institution, the lynch mob, may be encom-
passed within the designation "state action" to the extent that it displaces state
authority, see Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 855, 871-73 (1948).
82See Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic"
Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); cf. DAVIS, FOSTER, JEFFERY & DAVIS,
SOCIETY AND THE LAw: NEW MEANING FOR AN OLD PROFESSION 47-49 (1962);
MACIVER, THE MODERN STATE 13-18 (1926); TIMASHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAw 218-21, 284-85 (1939); 1 VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END
238 (Husik transl. 1924). See generally AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DE-
TERMINED 197-314 (1832).
13 Cf. Comment, 52 YALE L.J. 855, 871-72 & n.103 (1948).
The term "sovereign" is something of a conceptual problem in any context but
especially so when the discussion pertains to the states of the Union. The reference
here is to those areas in which the federal government has not as yet preempted
state governmental authority.
8' Cf. Hale, supra note 82, at 199. Consider the approach of Evans v. Newton,
882 U.S. 296 (1966), that when private individuals or groups take over from the
state "powers or functions governmental in nature" such individuals or organizations
become "instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations."
Id. at 299. Newton dealt with maintenance of municipal parks but the rationale
covers the provision of police protection and general exercise of governing authority.
To the extent, for example, that private individuals exercise governmental functions,
such as a lynch mob does in executing a prisoner, then those individuals would di-
rectly fall under the ban of the constitutional restrictions. See Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953) (dealing with various stages of the electoral process exercised by
private groups); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (religious solicitation in a
privately-owned town); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (dealing with various
stages of the electoral process); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949) (same);
Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) (same).
" The notion that a riotous mob is required to extend the protection of equal
laws (and due process of law, one may not doubt) may at first blush appear to
partake of the absurd. This is, however, merely a utilization of legal terminology
to rationalize a predetermined result. Consider the analysis of Saleilles: "One wills
at the beginning the result; one finds the principle afterwards; such is the genesis
of all judicial construction," quoted in CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL Paocss
170 (1921).
Another approach may be suggested by a dictum in Texas v. White, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 700 (1868). Under pressure of determining the effect to be given to the
domestic legal actions of the confederate states during the civil war, the Supreme Court
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The Terms of Section 333: Prerequisites to Intervention
Having considered the historical events giving rise to section
333 and its constitutional basis, we may turn to a discussion of the
conditions precedent to federal action under the authority of this
statute.8 6 We are met at the outset with the most difficult passage,
both in terms of its obscurity and the stringent prerequisite to
federal intervention which it purports to lay down. Under sub-
section 1, violence, conspiracy, etc., which "hinders the execution of
the laws of that State" and those "of the United States within the
State" shall be suppressed1s The Judiciary Committee of the Senate
offered the following definition of the term "state": "It is not difficult to see that
.. . the primary conception is that of a people or community. The people, in what-
ever territory dwelling, either temporarily or permanently, and whether organized
under a regular government, or united by looser and less definite relations, constitute
the state." Id. at 720.
The key is the phraseology "united by looser and less definite relations." If a
"mob" stages a putsch and gains de facto control of certain territory, it may fall
within this definition of "state," and hence fall under the prohibitions of the four-
teenth amendment. It may attenuate the argument to the final breaking point,
however, to suggest that the people in a mob presently raging out of control are
"united by . . . relations" which have even the remotest coloration of de facto
government.
In passing it may be noted that while these suggestions have been framed with
reference to a mob engaged in riot, the approach could be applied to clandestine
terrorist organizations, such as the 1871 Klan, which vie with the state governments
for control of the population.
80 It may be helpful to set out at this point the various portions of § 333 which
will be considered presently in the text.
"The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any
other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a
State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it-
[A.] (1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States
within the State,
[B.] that any part or class of its people
[C.] is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Con-
stitution
[D.] and secured by law,
[E.] and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail or refuse to protect
that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
[F.] (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes
the course of justice under those laws." 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1964).
8rThe conjunctive was added in the House only after considerable debate.
Initially, the section referred only to hindering the execution of the laws of the
state. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 317 (1871). However, the moderate Republi-
cans became quite squeamish when confronted by the notion of using federal troops
to enforce state law. See the extensive discussion of congressional power generally
under the fourteenth amendment by Representative Garfield, id. at app. 151-54; and
the remarks of Representative Willard, id. at app. 189.
On the Radical side it was contended that the federal government had power to
enforce local law when the state refused to do so as a means or necessary incident to
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had stricken this clause from the House-passed bill,88 objecting (1) to
the apparent requirement of literal obstruction or interference
with governmental officials attempting to carry out their legally
imposed functions;8 9 and (2) to the fact that execution of both
federal and state laws must be so hindered. The Committee felt
that intervention under this formula would be extremely difficult
because few of the existing conditions fulfilled the requirements
enumerated.90 In addition, the Judiciary Committee had provided,
by way of a new clause, for federal intervention whenever the same
violence or conspiracies obstructed "the equal and impartial course
of justice." 91 This was interpreted to embrace the administration
of justice by both the state and federal courts.92
All of this was too much for the moderate Republicans, 3 not
to mention the Democrats. 94 Therefore, the phraseology adopted
the enforcement of federal law. Id. at 477 (remarks of Representative Dawes). The
opposition prevailed, however, and the conjunctive "and of the United States" was
added. Id. at 513, 521-22.
88The version of § 3 of the Enforcement Act as reported by the Judiciary
Committee began approximately in the following manner: That in all cases where
insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies in any State
shall deprive any portion or class of the people of such State of any of the rights,
privileges, immunities or protection named in the Constitution and secured by this
act or obstruct the equal and impartial course of justice, and the constituted au-
thorities of such State .... See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 521-22, 567, 703 (1871).
In addition to striking the "hinder the execution" clause, the Committee added the
italicized portion, which later in the proceedings was shifted, and as part of what
was to become paragraph 2 of § 333 applied only to the "course of justice"
under federal law. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 703, app. 335-36 (1871).
89 Senator Edmunds, spokesman for the Judiciary Committee, pointed out the
following: "As the section now stands, . . . these insurrections and unlawful com-
binations or conspiracies, in order to be interfered with by the President of the
United States by military power, must ... go to the point of obstructing and hinder-
ing in the technical sense (when anybody is interfered with under it) the execution of
the laws of that State and also the laws of the United States, putting it in the
conjunctive." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871). (Emphasis added.)
90 Continuing, Senator Edmunds stated: "In a case of that kind it would involve
a great deal of difficulty and require a great deal of proof to reach the point where
the President could interfere at all. We thought it desirable to leave his right to
interfere . . . upon a plain and simple state of facts, as follows: first, that there
should be a conspiracy, an unlawful combination which should be so far carried into
effect as to deprive as a matter of fact some portion or class of the people of a
State of the rights and privileges which the Constitution of the United States
secures to them, so that the President would have a plain and simple case to act
upon, which nobody could misunderstand .... Ibid.
91 See id. at 567, 703. See note 88 supra.
912 See id. at 567.
91 See, e.g., id. at 687 (remarks of Senator Schurz); id. at 581 (remarks of Senator
Trumbull).
" See, e.g., id. at 572 (remarks of Senator Stockton).
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by the House was restored,95 resulting in the incorporation of lan-
guage which is substantially the same as that appearing in section
333 today. The clause referring to the "course of justice" was
dropped to paragraph 2 of section 333 and limited solely to the
"course of justice" as administered by the federal courts.96
With this background we must still determine what federal
and state laws the hindrance of which will bring into play section
333 and the circumstances under which they will be "hindered"
within the meaning of the statute.97 Section 333 itself indicates that
the hindrance of any federal law is not necessarily sufficient; rather,
the hindrance must produce or result in the deprivation of a federal
constitutional right.98 This immediately brings to mind the various
Or Concerning the restoration, Senator Edmunds stated that "it is to meet the
views of those who thought the amendments of the committee . . . were too harsh,
and that they authorized the use of the military in aid of the courts of justice in too
easy a case as the committee first reported the section. We therefore concluded to
leave those words stand as they were in the House bill in that part of the section
where they are in the conjunctive, which would not allow the United States to inter-
fere if their own laws were opposed, unless the State laws were also; and in order
to get rid of that difficulty we have added words referring solely to the laws of the
United States and the courts of the United States [in the second paragraph of the
section] .... " Id. at 703.
"See ibid.
7 In its enthusiasm to advocate federal intervention under § 333, the United
States Civil Rights Commission has stated that its interpretation "does not involve or
require a violation of Federal statutes to permit Presidential action although section
333 speaks of interference with State laws and laws 'of the United States.' The legis-
lative history suggests that the requirement of interference with 'laws of the United
States' would be satisfied by interference with rights protected under the 14th
amendment." U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, LAw ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL
PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 155 n.6 (1965).
However, this conclusion is not supported by the authorities which the Commission
cites. For example, reference is made to Representative Shellabarger's discussion of
the original House bill, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 71 (1871), which does
not contain the phraseology "laws of the United States." See note 87 supra and ac-
companying text. Citation is also made to a speech of Representative Shellabarger
concerning the addition of the conjunctive "and of the United States" in which the
representative comments that § 333 had been changed so as "to require that the au-
thority of the United States . . . also be invaded and defied." Id. at 478. Finally,
the remarks of Senator Edmunds made after the Judiciary Committee had struck the
entire "hinder the execution" clause (see notes 89-90 supra and accompanying
text), are cited, as well as his comments at the time the House phraseology was
restored (see note 95 supra and accompanying text).
As the Commission's citations make clear, the "hinder the execution" clause in
the final version of § 333 referred to interference with the carrying into effect or
implementation of the laws, not to a mere arguable denial of equal protection.
Furthermore, because § 333 refers specifically to constitutional rights, privileges, and
protection, reading the "hinder the execution" clause such that it is also satisfied by a
deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights has the effect of reducing this very
much debated clause to utter surplusage.
98 For example, hindering revenue agents in the apprehension of federal tax law
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federal civil rights statutes which are designed in large measure
to secure and protect federal constitutional rights, 9 but these need
not be the exclusive fount. If, for example, a conspiracy should be
formed to obstruct proceedings in the federal courts, the hindered
laws are those relating to federal judicial procedure, but the effect
is to deprive those seeking access to the courts of their constitutional
right to due process of law.
In connection with the state laws which must be "hindered," the
situation is analogous to the "federal law" interpretation. Once
again the criterion is interference with execution of the laws
which proceeds to the point of deprivation of a federal constitutional
right as, for example, the right to the protection of equal laws.
Because the states are charged in the first instance with law en-
forcement through the local agencies, it is easier to identify the state
law element. For example, in the case of uncontrollable rioting,
it is the unlawful assembly, anti-riot, and trespass statutes which
may be obstructed. In situations of general lawlessness, as in 1871,
virtually the entire state criminal machinery is opposed.100
As to what may constitute a hindrance or obstruction of state
law, it may be said that any impediment to effectuating state laws
when such condition results in a denial of constitutional rights is
within the contemplation of section 333.101 This would seem to
include those instances in which the unlawful combination or con-
spiracy, or those engaged in violence, enjoy the benevolent non-
violators would not seem to produce a deprivation of constitutional rights. However,
if the federal officers were attempting to enforce federal civil rights legislation, their
obstruction would tend to deprive the victims of remedies and protection provided
by the federal constitution and laws for violations of their civil rights.
E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964); REv. STAT. §§ 1979-80 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985 (3) (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 5,
28, 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (codified in scattered sections of 18,
20, 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of
5, 28, 42 U.S.C.); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
100 See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
101Thus, Representative Hawley stated that section 333 would allow intervention
"under such circumstances as the failure of the State authority to execute the law
for any reason whatever, through the unlawful complicity of the State authorities
in favor of those engaged in certain conspiracies or insurrection, or from any such
cause by which the citizens of the United States are deprived of those rights men-
tioned in the first and second sections [of the Enforcement Act]." CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (1871). (Emphasis added.)
Of course, when speaking of equal protection, congressmen referred to "denial"
in the sense of withholding that protection. Denial implies the failure to extend for
whatever reason, including inability and refusal. See note 39 supra and accompanying
text.
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interference of the local authorities. The laws are more certainly
sabotaged, and their effectuation prevented, by official nonfeasance
than by a concerted opposition of citizens. 102
With respect to the hindrance of federal law, it is well to point
out initially what has been stated elsewhere,103 and which is equally
applicable to the state laws; namely, that hindrance means some-
thing more than mere violation of law. It denotes a serious
impediment to the implementation of the law by the ordinary
civil processes. There is necessarily something of a subjective
distinction to be made here, and it is the President's responsibility
to ascertain the substance of the distinction and determine when
civil authority must be reinforced by the military or other extraord-
inary federal force. Such reinforcement may be needed in at least
two instances: (1) in cases in which violators of laws such as federal
criminal civil rights legislation become too numerous to be appre-
hended by the usual authorities. This, of course, was the original
purpose of section 333,104 but it is unlikely to be an important con-
temporary factor except under extreme conditions because of the
existence of numerous federal law enforcement agencies estab-
lished since the statute was passed, most notably the FBI; (2) the
second situation is that of mass violence, or rioting, wherein civil
authority, including that of the federal government, is opposed.
It is quite true that section 333 was not designed as an anti-riot
statute. It happens, however, that some riot situations fit the
statutory criteria and that domestic violence in the form of racial
disturbances is a major problem in the present day. It is certainly
the case that when rioting rages uncontrolled any civil law which
202 It is true that in 1871 the Radicals retained control of most of the southern
governments (see RANDALL & DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRucrION 683, 685
(2d ed. 1961)), and were concerned with the removal of obstructions to the functioning
of these governments. Some congressmen directed their attention to this particular
facet of the situation. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 514 (1871) (re-
marks of Representative Poland). Others, however, viewing with alarm the rapid
disintegration of the carpetbag regimes, contemplated the circumstance in which state
officials might act in complicity with the conspirators. See, e.g., remarks of Repre-
sentative Hawley, supra note 101. Thus the last clause of paragraph 1 of § 333 refers
to the inability, failure, or refusal of the state authorities so to execute state law as to
prevent the deprivation of federal constitutional rights.
It should be pointed out, however, that it may not be possible to bring within
the scope of § 333 every conceivable situation of violence. If, for example, state
officials such as the state police actually enforce a law, it would be difficult to find that
state law was "hindered" in its execution, even if the constitutionality of the par-
ticular law or its application were later challenged.
103 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
204 See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text.
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purports to act directly upon the individual in the afflicted area must
necessarily be "hindered" in its execution. 105
Section 333 continues by prescribing that a "part or class" of the
populace must have been deprived of federal constitutional rights.
Just how many are necessary to comprise the requisite portion is not
clear, but it would seem that if any significant segment of the popu-
lation were affected, this would be sufficient.100 As a practical matter,
of course, the size of the class may relate directly to a determination
that federal law is being hindered in its execution. The greater the
number of people being deprived of constitutional rights, as in
rioting, for example, the greater the chance that the regular civil
authorities will be unable to execute the laws.
Turning to the question of the constitutional "right, privilege,
immunity, or protection," the deprivation of which will satisfy the
statute, one finds that subsequent constitutional development neces-
sitates a shifting of emphasis among these terms. Congressmen in the
Forty-second Congress placed a great deal of reliance upon that
masterpiece of Radical ambiguity, 0 7 the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment, with an elucidating inter-
pretive gloss supplied by Mr. Justice Washington's opinion on cir-
cuit in Corfield v. Coryell.08 In that opinion some of the privileges
and immunities of state citizenship within the scope of article IV,
section 2 of the Constitution 00 were detailed, and this discussion
was more or less "incorporated" into the congressional (which is to
r05 To this point the discussion as it relates to the obstruction of federal law is
also applicable as an explication of paragraph 2 of § 333.10 Mr. Shellabarger, who chaired the House committee which composed the
statute, insisted that it referred to more than "one individual merely." CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 71 (1871). Opposing Representative Farnsworth, however,
was unconvinced. He insisted that one man is a "portion" and that two can make
an "unlawful combination." Id. at app. 114.
Of course, the statute was originally designed to embrace those who fell into one
or both of the Republican and Negro categories. Nevertheless, no identifiable class
was enumerated in the statute.
107 For the view that there was no consensus in the Thirty-ninth Congress as to
the meaning and scope of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment, see Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,
2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 139 (1949); HARRIS, THE QUEsT FOR EQUALiTY 39-40 (1960).
'186 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Quotations from
Corfield v. Coryell were made by Representative Frelinghuysen, CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1871); Senator Vickers, id. at 660; Representative Shellabarger,
id. at app. 69; Representative Bingham, id. at app. 84, Representative Willard, id.
at app. 188.
100 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
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say, Radical) view of the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment.110 Representative Shellabarger emphasized
that Mr. Justice Washington had included "protection by the gov-
ernment" among the fundamental privileges and immunities of
citizens."' This item formed a link in the discussion between the
privileges and immunities clause and the parallel effect of the equal
protection clause.".2 It is most fortunate that the major alternative
ground to the guarantee accorded by the privileges and immunities
proviso was present in the equal protection clause, for whatever
hopes the Radicals may have had for the viability of the privileges
and immunities concept were annihilated by the Supreme Court in
the Slaughter-House Cases."3 Notwithstanding the demise of the
privileges and immunities clause, there is certainly sufficient vi-
tality in the equal protection clause, and in the notion of "protec-
tion by the government" contained therein, to afford a wide basis
for the application of section 333 in cases of widespread, uncon-
trolled violence.
Another prerequisite to federal intervention is that the consti-
tutional right, privilege, immunity or protection must be "secured
110 The fact that Corfield's broad language referred to privileges of state citizenship
and the fact that, on the other hand, the fourteenth amendment refers to privileges
of citizens of the United States were fully exploited in the Slaughter-House Cases,
which rejected the Corfield formula. See note 113 infra and accompanying text.
In any event, Mr. Justice Washington's interpretation of article IV, § 2 is said
to be ambiguous, self-contradictory, and partially wrong. See Fairman, supra note 107,
at 9-12, 56.
In addition to reliance upon Corfield, Representative Bingham insisted that the
rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments were also within the scope of the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871). The historical accuracy of this view is doubted by
modem authority, Mr. Justice Black to the contrary notwithstanding. See Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947). See TENBRoEK, THE AINTISLAVERY OIUGINS OF
THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT 223-24 (1951); Fairman, supra note 74; Graham, The
"Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938); Morrison,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? the Judicial Interpre-
tation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1949). But see 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONsTuTION
1083, 1119 (1953).
1" CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 69 (1871).
112 Section 333 was amended in the Senate specifically to include the term protection
following "right, privilege, immunity." Id. at 703.
213 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Commentary on the Slaughter-House Cases has
hardly been commendatory. See, e.g., 1 BuRGEss, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE
CONsrTIOunNAL LAW 225-28 (1890); McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IowA L. BuL. 219, 221-22 (1918); Trimble, The Privileges
of Citizens of the United States, 10 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 77, 84 (1942); Weihofen, The




by law." As originally enacted,114 the statute read "secured by this
act," meaning the Enforcement Act of April 20, 1871. Hence the
removal of the specific reference to the Act of April 20 broadens
the phrase to comprehend constitutional rights secured by federal
law generally, including both the criminal"' and civil statutes."1 "
The key to the interpretation of this clause lies in the term "se-
cured." There is authority for the proposition that secured means
"created by, arising under or dependent upon""17 federal law rather
than the more stringent requirement that the constitutional right be
protected fully by federal statutes."18 Of course, recent enactments
have greatly increased the scope of rights extensively protected
by federal law. 19 Furthermore, federal law in the formal sense does
in fact purport to guarantee many other of the broad rights defined
by the fourteenth amendment, 20 even if the effectiveness of the
legislation implementing those rights does leave a good deal to be
desired.
The question as to the identity of the "constituted authorities"
within the meaning of the statute who may be unable, fail, or refuse
to protect constitutional rights may be disposed of summarily.
While there is evidence that this phrase in the original House bill
referred only to local as opposed to state authorities,' 2' amendment
in the Senate tended to remove this distinction. 22 Hence, the final
11 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 14 (1871).
115 See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
20 Federal constitutional rights may be secured by legislation which is non-
criminal in nature. In fact, most of the recent enactments (see note 99 supra) have
been of this type.
117 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 293 (1892).
11l United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. at 1189 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
1 19 See the recently enacted civil rights statutes cited note 99 supra.
20 For example, Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, provides: "All persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." REv.
STAT. § 1977 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
12 1 The House bill contained the additional clause "and the constituted authoritics
of such State shall ... fail or neglect, through the proper authorities, to apply to the
President of the United States for aid .... " CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 317
(1871). As to the distinction, Mr. Farnsworth offered the following: "Do 'constituted
authorities' mean those of a city, or town, or county, and 'proper authorities' those
of the State? Undoubtedly that is the intention. It is admitted that there are 'proper
authorities' through which to apply to the President, and that can only mean the
Legislature, or Governor, if the Legislature is not in session, as provided by the Con-
stitution." Id. at app. 114-15.
122 The section was amended so as to strike out the entire clause relating to a failure
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phraseology encompassed both local and state officials. 123 Further-
more, it would seem that responsibility for maintaining order
ascends from local officials in the first instance, through state au-
thority, to the federal government in the last resort. It would seem
particularly incongruous, in view of the federal structure, to sanction
the intervention of the general government when local authority
alone breaks down, if the state is ready and able to step in and restore
order effectively.
In considering paragraph 2 of section 833, which provides for
federal intervention whenever the execution of federal law is ob-
structed, one must recall that this provision was appended as the
result of a compromise, 12 4 the prevailing view being that federal
military force ought not to be authorized in direct support of the
state courts. Thus paragraph 2 refers only to the execution of federal
laws and the course of justice thereunder. 25 As such, paragraph 2
overlaps paragraph 1 to the extent that each contemplates inter-
ference with the execution of federal laws. Distinctions in their
of the "constituted authorities" to apply to the President for aid through the "proper
authorities." Id. at 567.
223 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
124 See note 88 and text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
15 Paragraph 2 of § 333 could be applied to the enforcement of federal court orders
under the following theories: (1) The "course of justice" refers to the normal processes
of the federal courts. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, if
the situation is such that court orders cannot be enforced by marshals, who are
the ordinary functionaries, then paragraph 2 authorizes the use of stronger measures,
including troops. (2) Under 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1964), marshals are required to "execute
all lawful writs, processes and orders issued under the authority of the United
States and command all necessary assistance to execute ... [their] duties." If marshals
are prevented from executing court orders, then there is an obstruction of this federal
mandate.
Even the opponents of the use of federal troops to enforce federal court orders
concede that paragraph 2 could plausibly be applied to that end. See Schweppe,
Enforcement of Federal Court Decrees: A "Recurrence to Fundamental Principles,"
44 A.B.A.J. 113, 114 (1958). The argument is advanced, however, that in the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, § 122, 71 Stat. 637, Congress repealed REv. STAT. § 1989 (1875),
which had explicitly authorized such intervention in certain civil rights cases. The
point pressed is that repeal of the specific authorization necessarily implied repeal
of the more general statute which could conceivably apply to the particular circum-
stance. Schweppe, supra at 114.
This analysis, however, would render a valid statute, namely, § 333, paragraph
2, devoid of much of its original force. Even if the argument from implication were
accepted, the fact is that the repealed Rxv. STAT. § 1989 (1875) referred only to
judicial processes issued in the civil actions created by Rxv. STAT. §§ 1977-80, 1988,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985, 1992 (1964). Furthermore, there is evidence to indicate
that in 1957 Congress was merely attempting to place civil rights legislation on a par
with other legislation as regards enforcement of court orders through the military
and did not intend to eliminate this mode of enforcement. See Pollitt, A Dissenting
View: The Executive Enforcement of Judicial Decrees, 45 A.BA.J. 600, 603 (1959).
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application when both federal and state law are hindered would
seem to go more to pragmatic questions of the extent and purpose
of the intervention rather than to when such intervention could be
undertaken. 12 6
Some insight into this distinction is provided by Ex parte Sie-
bold, 27 where the Supreme Court, in a case not noted for its nig-
gardly interpretation of federal power, commented that the federal
government had "the power to command obedience to its laws,
and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent."' 28 This case
suggests (though the interpretation of section 333 was not in issue)
that the federal government could properly intervene under para-
graph 2 of section 333 to the extent necessary to enforce its own
laws. 29 But the purpose for intervention under paragraph 1 is
much broader. There the state has been deemed to have denied the
equal protection of the laws and the federal objective is to accord
that protection. 30 Furthermore, under section 1 federal force may
be directed toward violence or conspiracy which is obstructing state
judicial proceedings or preventing state and local authorities from
executing those state laws which provide constitutional "protec-
tion." After all, this protection was a basic purpose of the original
statute.131
A final prerequisite to federal intervention, as well under sec-
120 Paragraph 2 is triggered solely by interference with federal law and is basically an
instrumentality for the enforcement of that law. If federal law alone is hindered, the
sole remedy is under paragraph 2, or 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1964). If state law alone is
interfered with, there is no remedy under either paragraphs 1 or 2. If the execution of
both federal and state law is obstructed, the remedy may be under paragraphs 1 or 2
to the extent described in the following textual paragraph.
127 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
12 8 
Id. at 395.
12 Consistent with Ex parte Siebold, there is authority which tends to indicate
that military force could be utilized to enforce federal laws even in the absence of a
congressional enactment. It has been stated, for example, that the executive power of
article II, § 2 of the Constitution is the power to execute the laws. Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926). However, since there have been federal statutes
authorizing the use of military force since 1792, Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, §§ 1-2, 1
Stat. 264, the predecessor of 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-32 (1964), the unaided executive
power has never been delineated. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895); note 56
supra. For a discussion of the civil rights application of the Debs rationale for the
granting of injunctions against violence in the absence of explicit statutory au-
thorization, see Burke, The Civil Rights Uses of In re Debs, 1 LAw IN TRANSITION Q.
139 (1964).
130 When paragraph 1 is invoked, federal authorities would not be interested
solely in the delivery of the mails or the protection of revenue agents; riot, violence,
or conspiracy could be suppressed to the point at which equal protection is restored.
231 See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
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tions 331 and 332 as under section 333, is the issuance of a presi-
dential proclamation ordering an end to violence.132 Various Presi-
dents have interpreted this provision somewhat differently, but the
consensus appears to be that a proclamation is a legal requirement' 33
and that its purpose is a final warning to the unlawful elements in
an attempt to avert resort to the extreme measure of using troops. 34
In any event, proclamations have regularly been issued prior to
troop commitments in the course of the recent incidents. 3 5
The President's Authority Under Section 333
The President has wide discretion to act under section 333 in
at least two significant aspects: (1) he determines which circum-
stances require this extraordinary exercise of power and in those
instances is authorized to "take such measures as he considers neces-
sary"; (2) he also is to choose the form of intervention, whether
by the armed forces, the militia, "or any other means."
With respect to the latter element, there is some uncertainty
as to what measures come within the scope of "any other means."
On this the congressional debates shed no light whatsoever. 3 6 The
explanation most consistent with the breadth of the phraseology
would suggest that the President may utilize any individuals or
agency which is at his disposal and suited to law enforcement, which
would include federal marshals.
The question of the legal propriety of the President's use of
this discretion to take particular action in a given circumstance is a
much more difficult problem, turning as it does upon the extent to
which, if any, his action pursuant to section 333 will be subject to
judicial review. 3 7 The basic obstacle to review of the President's
132A proclamation must be issued in accordance with the terms of 10 U.S.C. §
334 (1964): "Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the
armed forces under this chapter [chapter 15 of title 10, U.S.C., entitled 'Insurrection,'
which includes §§ 331-34], he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the in-
surgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time."
13 See RICH, THE PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL DISORDER 201-06 (1941). For the opinion
of Attorney General Brownell to this effect, see 41 Ops. AiTr'y GEN. 313, 327 (1957).
34% RICH, op. cit. supra note 133, at 206.
23 Proc. No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957); Proc. No. 3497, 27 Fed. Reg. 9681
(1962); Proc. No. 3542, 28 Fed. Reg. 5707 (1963); Proc. No. 3554, 28 Fed. Reg. 9861
(1963).
"'3 The only discussion on this point was the unheeded statement by Representa-
tive Hawley that he favored striking the phrase "or other means" because he said
he did not know what other means the President should be authorized to employ.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (1871).
287 The only major consequence which apparently would follow a Court determina-
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discretion is that a decision by the coordinate executive branch to
employ the military to suppress violence is a classic illustration of
a "political question." As early as 1827 the Supreme Court in
Martin v. Mott,138 commenting on the President's discretion under a
statute authorizing the calling out of the militia to repel invasion
and suppress insurrection,13 9 noted that his discretion was abso-
lute.140 Furthermore, the only court which has ever directly con-
tion that the President did in fact act outside his statutory authority would be the
withdrawal of troops or other forces allegedly sent in under § 333 and the resultant
political consequences which such a decision would have for the President. A suit
for damages against the federal government under the Tort Claims Act is precluded
by the explicit provision that there can be no recovery for discretionary acts even if
they are taken pursuant to an invalid statute. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, §
421 (a), 60 Stat. 842 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964). Furthermore, any
convictions obtained as a result of arrests effected by the forces dispatched in the
abuse of discretion would not necessarily be overturned, for even in the event that
such arrests were held to be illegal, it does not follow that this is a jurisdictional
defect as regards the courts before which the arrestees may be tried. See 4 WnARTON,
CriurmnAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1484 (12th ed. 1957); cf. Albrecht v. United States,
273 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1927).
Consider an analogous situation in which the accused is removed by illegal
means from one jurisdiction to another. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a unani-
mous Court in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), rejected the contention that such
a defect would overturn a subsequent conviction in the following terms: "This Court
has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444,
that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that
he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of 'forcible abduc-
tion.'. . . [D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted
of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a
fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing
in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully con-
victed to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will." Frisbie v.
Collins, supra at 522. The notion that Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1961) impliedly
overrules Frisbie by forbidding all such "'shortcut methods in law enforcement'"
was summarily rejected in Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561, 562 (10th Cir. 1964)
(per curiam).
11125 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
""Act of February 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424.
140 "We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen, belongs exclusively to the president, and that his decision is conclusive
upon all other persons. . . . The power itself is to be exercised upon sudden emer-
gencies, upon great occasions of state, and under circumstances which may be vital
to the existence of the Union . . . . Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power
to any person, to be exercised by him, upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a
sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive
judge of the existence of those facts." 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 30-32. See The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1848). There are frequent Supreme Court statements which demonstrate the solicitude
with which the Court approaches questions concerning the discretionary exercise
of power by the co-ordinate political branches. One of these is found in Dakota
Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 168, 184 (1919): "But as the contention at
best concerns not a want of power, but a mere excess or abuse of discretion in ex-
erting a power given, it is clear that it involves considerations which are beyond the
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fronted section 8333 came to the conclusion that "the necessity of
using troops ...in any given emergency" is "solely for the deter-
mination of the President," citing Martin v. Mott.'4' However, in
recent years the judicial deference in matters relating to "political
questions" has significantly diminished 142 and it is perhaps unwise
to rely upon the assumption that the Court will maintain a strict
hands-off policy with respect to those matters remaining within this
category.143
The authority to use military force was circumscribed in the
case of Sterling v. Constantin,'" in which the Supreme Court not
only reviewed an act of military discretion of the governor of Texas
but upheld an injunction against his declaration of martial law in
a particular Texas county. The Court held that the governor's
broad discretionary powers were not absolute, flagrant abuse of
discretion being an occasion for judicial determination and inter-
reach of judicial power. This must be since, as this court has often pointed out,
the judicial may not invade the legislative or executive departments so as to correct
alleged mistakes or wrongs arising from asserted abuse of discretion." (Emphasis
added.)
141 Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. v. Beale, 282 Fed. 934, 936 (S.D. Ohio 1922).
1412The most notable example, of course, is the series of reapportionment cases
beginning with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, Mr. Justice Brennan
discussed at some length the criteria of the "political question," taking as his ex-
ample the guaranty clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. It is of interest that Mr. Justice
Douglas in his concurring opinion specifically disavowed Mr. Justice Brennan's
suggestion that all guaranty clause issues would be unreviewable because classified
as "political questions." Baker v. Carr, supra at 242 n.2. See Bonfield, Baker v. Carr:
New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF.
L. REv. 245 (1962); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study
in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. Rav. 513 (1962).
"'3The relevance of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), may be noted at this point. There the Supreme Court affirmed the granting
of a preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Commerce from taking over
certain steel mills pursuant to a presidential executive order. The order was held to
be beyond the constitutional or statutory power of the President, and the decision
indicates that the Supreme Court may not hesitate to curb the aggrandizement of
power of the co-ordinate executive branch in particular instances, even if an element
of national emergency is involved.
However, there is a crucial distinction between Sawyer and presidential action
under § 333. The Court noted that the President's power must derive either from
the Constitution or from statute, and that no congressional enactment purported to
authorize seizure of the mills. Id. at 585-86 (Black, J.); id. at 585-609 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring), id. at 635-40 (Jackson, J., concurring), id. at 656-59 (Burton, J., con-
curring), id. at 660-62 (Clark, J., concurring). Thus, while the Court did restrain the
executive branch, it was made clear that similar presidential action pursuant to a
valid congressional statute would have been sustained. See also Texas v. White,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729-31 (1868).
144 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
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vention. 145 Of course, Sterling must be viewed with some caution in
our context, involving as it does the power of a state governor rather
than that of the coordinate executive branch, the Presidency.
Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that the Court would stand aside
in the case of "an act of mere oppression, an arbitrary fiat that
overleaps the bounds of judgment."'4 6
The question of review of the President's exercise of his power
under section 333 might arise in a variety of circumstances. Ala-
bama v. United States 47 suggests the possibility of a suit for the
removal of troops or an injunction against their use, brought against
the Secretary of Defense and alleging that his action in dispatching
troops was in excess of his statutory and/or constitutional au-
thority. 48 The issue of presidential discretion might also arise as a
1415 "It does not follow from the fact that the Executive has this range of dis-
cretion . . . that every sort of action the Governor may take, no matter how un-
justified by the exigency or subversive of private right and the jurisdiction of the
courts, otherwise available, is conclusively supported by mere executive fiat ...
What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have
been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions." Id. at 400-01.
140 Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
446 (1935), contrasting Sterling with Martin v. Mott.
1-7 373 U.S. 545 (1963) (per curiam).
'"The Government conceded in Alabama v. United States, citing Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), that such a suit is one against the
individual and not against the sovereign United States without its consent. Brief for
Defendants, p. 6. See note 143 supra.
The disposition of Alabama v. United States on the ripeness issue (see notes 16-18
supra and accompanying text) raises the question of when a request for an injunction
against action under § 333 would be considered on the merits. Apparently, a plaintiff
would have to establish in addition to any movements of federal forces that the
President clearly intended to commit them to action and, of course, that such com-
mitment would result in irreparable injury to the plaintiff.
A related procedural issue concerns the factors which may give a state standing to
raise the issue of the constitutionality of § 333. In Alabama v. United States it was
averred that the use of troops under § 333 was "in violation of the sovereignty of
the State of Alabama." Complaint, p. 4. Allegations of unconstitutional invasion of
the State's reserved powers have been held sufficient to give a state standing to
challenge the constitutionality of federal statutes. For example, in Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the Court, per Mr. Justice Holmes, stated that "the
ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional interference with the
rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, and that acts of the defendant
done and threatened under that authority invade the sovereign right of the State
and contravene its will manifested in statutes. The State also alleges a pecuniary
interest, admitted by the Government to be sufficient, but it is enough that the bill
is a reasonable and proper means to assert the alleged quasi sovereign rights of a
State." Id. at 431, citing Marshall Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460, 462 (1913);
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185
U.S. 125, 142 (1902). See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1944); Hop.
kins Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 337 (1935).
In Alabama v. United States it was further contended that the "threat to do-
mestic law and order within Alabama posed by the continuing presence of the
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defense to a false imprisonment suit or habeas corpus action brought
by an individual taken into custody by the extraordinary federal
authorities.149
The Administration of Section 333
As noted above, the original function of section 333 was to pro-
vide a vehicle for the apprehension of violators of federal law,
criminal civil rights legislation in particular. 50 These persons
were then to be turned over to the federal marshal for prosecution
in the federal courts.' 5 However, the clause relating to the mar-
Armed Forces is immediate and can only be removed by the granting of the
restraining order .... " Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 11.
It may be suggested that the state as parens patriae would have standing to
assert the rights of its citizens who are threatened with violence allegedly caused by the
unconstitutional presence of federal forces. Cf. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra
at 451; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208, 241, 243 (1901).
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that the state in essence is
seeking to insulate her citizens from the operation of a federal statute. Thus, in
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Court stated that "it cannot be
conceded that a State, as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect
citizens of the United States from the operation of the statutes thereof. While the
State, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of
its citizens .... it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect
of their relations with the Federal Government." Id. at 485-86. However, the Court
added that "we need not go so far as to say that a State may never intervene
by suit to protect its citizens against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional
acts of Congress .... ." Id. at 485. (Emphasis added.) See Florida v. Mellon, 273
U.S. 12, 18 (1927); Minnesota v. Benson, 274 F.2d 764, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1960). But see
New York v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 856, 872 (N.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 331 U.S.
284 (1947).
19 Cf. Duncan v. Kahanamoku (Hawaiian Martial Law Cases), 827 U.S. 304
(1945), in which the substitution of military for civilian trials, ordered by the Gov-
ernor of Hawaii and approved by the President was held not to be authorized by
the Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 153 (1900); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), finding no abuse of discretion in excluding those of
Japanese ancestry from military zones under Exac. ORDER No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407
(1942), issued pursuant to the Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (now 18
U.S.C. § 1383 (1964)); Luther v. Borden, 17 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1848), in which the
fact that martial law had been declared by the state legislature was a sufficient de-
fense to an action for trespass.
'1 See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
"1Section 333 presents an explicit exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, enacted
as Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1964). The act
forbids under criminal penalty the use of the armed forces to execute "the laws"
except in cases of explicit congressional or constitutional authorization. At one
time it was tenable to argue that the Posse Comitatus statute, passed in 1878, was
intended to apply only to subsequent congressional authorization. This view, as it
affects § 333, is effectively answered by the observation that in 1956 Congress recodi-
fled both statutes in the same enactment, Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 333, 10
U.S.C. § 333 (1964), in the case of section 333; and ch. 1041, § 18 (a), 18 U.S.C. § 1385
(1964), for the Posse Comitatus statute. See Schweppe, supra note 125, at 190, 192.
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shals was deleted in 1875 in the Revised Statutes version'0 2 and in
subsequent recodifications. 153 Therefore, as to those taken into
custody by the federal forces, the following possibilities appear to
exist as to their disposition:
1. Those arrested could be turned over to the state authorities
to be prosecuted for violations of state and local law. An objec-
tion here, however, is that in the situations involving paragraph 1
of section 333 the state has presumably failed to execute its own
law and has deprived elements of its populace of equal protection.
Therefore, the state courts may be an ineffective forum in which to
prosecute the arrestees. 154
Here one may observe another effect of a Court determination that the President
in a given instance had no statutory authorization for the use of troops-the conclusion
that the President has violated the Posse Comitatus Act. The act provides a prison
sentence of up to two years and/or a $10,000 fine. It would take, however, a rather
vivid imagination to suggest that a president is likely to enforce these provisions
against himself. For the view that the Posse Comitatus Act was intended to apply
only to the use of troops by federal marshals and not by the President, see Pollitt,
supra note 125, at 603, 606; 41 Ors. ATT'Y GEN. 313, 329-30 (1957); 19 Ors. ATr'Y GEN.
293-96, 570-71 (1890); 17 Ops. Arr'Y GEN. 333-35 (1882); 17 Oxs. AxTr'y GEN. 242-44
(1881); 16 Ops. A-rr'Y GEN. 162-64 (1878). Congressional opinion was divided on this
point. See 7 CoNG. REc. 3846-49, 4240-48 (1878).
12 REv. STAT. § 5299 (1875). The fact that alteration was made as a part of the
vast codification of federal law in the 1870's makes it impossible to isolate a congres-
sional "intent" as to the meaning of the change. As a basic proposition, the Revised
Statutes were supposed to be a reorganization of federal law, not an alteration in
substantive content. See remarks of Representative Poland, CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong.,
1st Sess. 646-48, 1029, 1210, 1461 (1874). Nevertheless, the deletion of the clause relat-
ing to marshals evidently eliminates that particular procedure as the only allowable
one under the statute.
r 50 U.S.C. § 203 (1926). and the present codification, 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1964).
'"It may be questioned whether those arrested by federal authority could be
tried for violation of state law in the federal courts. Of course, one begins with
the general proposition that "the federal courts are without jurisdiction to try al-
leged criminal violations of state statutes." Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45,
49-50 (1941). In some instances, however, federal courts do try violations of state law,
as when a case is removed to the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964) by an
accused who is denied in the state courts his equal civil rights guaranteed by federal
legislation. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 21, at 59 (1963).
At the time this removal statute was debated as § 3 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 14 Stat. 17, it was bitterly attacked on the ground that federal courts could not
constitutionally enforce state law. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 479-80
(1866) (remarks of Senator Saulsbury), id. at 598-99 (remarks of Senator Davis). The
constitutionality of the statute was, however, upheld in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1879), and Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1879); see California v. Chue Fan, 42 Fed. 865 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890).
In defending the removal bill, Senator Trumbull remarked that "the bill draws
to the Federal Government no power if the States will perform their constitutional
obligations." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 600 (1886). This suggests a possible
rationale for the enforcement of state law in the federal courts in the § 333 situation:
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2. There may be prosecution in the federal courts for violations
of federal civil rights legislation.155
3. Those taken into custody may be detained for a reasonable
period on the theory that the power to detain is an incident to that
of suppressing violence. Support for this conclusion is found in
Moyer v. Peabody,156 in which a former governor was sued by a labor
leader who had been held in custody for a month and a half during
the course of labor unrest. The Court held that there had been no
denial of due process.157 However, considering the expansion of
the state has failed to enforce its own law through its courts to provide that pro-
tection of the laws which the fourteenth amendment requires. Congress, therefore,
as a remedy for this state nonfeasance, may provide that protection which the state
has denied by utilizing the federal courts to enforce state law.
The argument, of course, is directed to the power of Congress. The question is,
however, whether Congress in § 333 intended to provide a federal forum for state
law enforcement. Aside from the implications for federalism inherent in this in-
terpretation, it is a fact that Congress initially intended to provide, in conjunction
with § 333, a federal forum for the prosecution of federal civil rights laws. See notes
30-31 supra and accompanying text and note 158 infra. It is therefore doubtful that
§ 333 can be properly stretched to the point of enforcement of state law in the federal
courts, both because of the legislative history of § 333 and its complete lack of
specificity on this point.
Ur Prosecution would proceed under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964), or under the
criminal provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (1964),
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, §§ 11, 12, 79 Stat. 443, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973i-j
(Supp. 1965). See notes 34-35 supra.
In addition, the provisions of § 7 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114,
16 Stat. 141, provided as follows: "That, if in the act of violating any provision of
the two preceding sections [one of which is the predecessor of § 241], any other felony,
crime or misdemeanor shall be committed, the offender, on conviction of such viola-
tion of said sections, shall be punished for the same, with such punishments as are
attached to said felonies, crimes, and misdemeanors, by the laws of the State in which
the offense may be committed."
Thus, when a conspiracy under federal law was accompanied by a crime under
state law, the conspiracy was to be punished with the same sentence as that pre-
scribed for the state crime. This presented a somewhat ingenious method of punish-
ing in the federal courts such crimes as murder, burglary, or assault, which are normally
prosecuted in state courts under state law. This statute, as Rav. STAT. § 5509 (1875),
was upheld in several cases. E.g., Rakes v. United States, 212 U.S. 55 (1909); Motes v.
United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). REv.
STAT. § 5509 (1875) was repealed by the Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 342, 35 Stat.
1153. However, discussion of § 5509 is relevant today, for the Justice Department
has considered asking for the enactment of a similar statute. See N.Y. Times,
March 30, 1965, p. 1, col. 4.
" 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
15As to the power of the Governor under the Colorado anti-insurrection law,
the United States Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Holmes, stated: "That means
that he shall make the ordinary use of soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons
who resist and, of course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies
of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are
not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution to prevent the
exercise of hostile power." Id. at 84-85.
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the due process concept since 1909, a lengthy detention would al-
most assuredly be subject to habeas corpus proceedings. 58
The question as to which of these dispositions would be most
appropriate is a matter which must await the application of section
333 to a given set of circumstances. A number of factors are relevant:
whether the state courts are sufficiently free of obstruction or
prejudice to provide a forum for effective prosecution; whether
a case can be made for federal statutory violations; or whether the
federal objective is merely to restore order in a riot-torn community.
It may be noted that the various courses of action suggested are
not mutually exclusive, though they could not necessarily be pur-
sued simultaneously. The appropriate tack will be largely a matter
of pragmatic exigency.
The Future Use of Section 333
What conclusions may finally be drawn from this survey of the
terms and history of section 333, together with its invocation during
the course of recent incidents? We may begin with the suggestion
that it would be well to distinguish sharply between the legal power
to act under section 333 and discretionary intervention in those
circumstances in which the statutory prerequisites are satisfied.
It was the failure to draw this distinction with clarity, both at the
time of the Birmingham riots in 1963 and in the aftermath of the
murder of the civil rights workers in Mississippi in 1964, which
precipitated a good deal of criticism of the Justice Department.5
1 8 A fourth possibility for the disposition of persons taken into federal custody
is the institution of military tribunals. This alternative is subject to a number of
infirmities. In the first instance, § 333 was intended to aid, rather than displace, the
civil courts in their execution of the laws. See CONG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
383 (1871) (remarks of Representative Hawley); note 16 supra. One would ap.
parently have to argue that the deletion in the Revised Statutes, note 152 supra,
changed the entire purpose and effect of § 333 by allowing the replacement of the
civil courts by military tribunals.
Furthermore, one will encounter the traditional hostility of the Supreme Court to the
utilization of military tribunals as long as the civil courts remain open. See Duncan v.
Kahanomoku (Hawaiian Martial Law Cases), 327 U.S. 304 (1945), Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Of course, we are presuming here that the civil courts are func-
tioning, as they have been during the recent crises. A situation may be posited,
however, in which insurrection or rebellion forces the closure of the courts. In that
event, the question of military tribunals appears in a new light. However, it is
debatable whether § 333 itself authorizes the establishment of such tribunals because
of its purpose to aid the civil courts and, by analogy, because Congress explicitly
provided for the case of rebellion and suspension of habeas corpus in the section
of the Third Enforcement Act immediately following the predecessor of § 333. See
note 23 supra.
1'9 Further confusion was added by the fact that various critics presented divergent
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It may be agreed that the President ought not to avoid political
responsibility for his non-action by using the shield of legal im-
potency. On the other hand, it is quite clear that he has a difficult
determination to make when issues relating to the invocation of
section 333 arise. And whichever course is decided upon, criticism
from those not in a position of responsibility is likely to be wide-
spread.
In the first instance, a conscientious attempt to apply the terms
of section 333 as a matter of law to a given set of circumstances is
itself frequently a troublesome assignment. Moreover, even if it
is decided that there is power to intervene, there is the basic and
acute political problem of whether troops are to be the means of
intervention. A long tradition of civilian government and distrust
of military rule, not to mention local autonomy in matters of
general law enforcement, is hardly conducive to ready acceptance
of massive federal intervention to supplant state and local author-
ity.160 Considerations of federalism must weigh heavily when con-
fronting suggestions that the federal government, under section 333
or otherwise, take over law enforcement functions traditionally
views as to the scope of federal intervention. Some merely suggested a "federal
presence," in the form of marshals or the FBI, for example, to help stabilize a situa-
tion permeated with racial tension. See N.Y. Times, June 27, 1964, p. 1, col. 8, p. 10,
col. 2; id., June 28, 1964, § 4 (Editorials), p. 1, col. 4. Such a "presence" can be
justified on the basis of preventing violations of federal law, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42
(1964), or providing a means to apprehend violators thereof. Here federal law is
merely being enforced by the federal civil authorities; this is not a § 333 situation.
Another group of critics went a good deal further and demanded "'preventive'
police action" in Mississippi to protect civil rights workers. N.Y. Times, June 25,
1964, p. 1, col. 5, p. 18, cols. 6-7. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. The
NAACP suggested transferring all law enforcement functions in Mississippi to the
federal government. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1964, p. 10, col. 7. To the extent that
purely local law enforcement responsibilities are to be taken over by federal au-
thorities, there is an extension of federal intervention beyond the mere enforcement
of federal statutes. It has been suggested that such an exertion of federal power
may be perfectly proper pursuant to paragraph 1 of 333. See notes 127-31 supra
and accompanying text. In such a situation, however, it is necessary to determine
in the first instance that the statutory prerequisites to intervention are satisfied.
100 If one speaks in terms of an influx of marshals, there is the added problem
that the federal process servers are numerically insufficient to take on long-term
law enforcement responsibilities. See N.Y. Times, June 26, 1964, p. 15, cols. 1-2.
There is in addition the related problem of how to effect a withdrawal of federal
forces once they have been committed, in order to prevent the federal government
from becoming bogged down in local law enforcement. In this connection, the
Justice Department has shown considerably greater enthusiasm for the use of force
when a court order, as in Little Rock or at the University of Mississippi, delimits
both the objective and the duration of the employment of federal power than when
there is no such well-defined and limited objective, as in Birmingham or Mississippi
in 1964. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
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exercised by state and local authorities. 1" Furthermore, intervention
and the manner thereof during the present period of readjustment
of relations between the races will be dictated in part as a matter of
tactics to achieve the administration goal of racial harmony. There-
fore, in recent years one observes the pursuit of a generally con-
ciliatory approach in the area of race relations. Great caution has
been taken with respect to the interposition of federal force,0 2 much
to the displeasure of some civil rights partisans.
Having summarily considered a few of the necessary components
of a decision to intervene under section 333, we may briefly con-
sider some of the situations in which such intervention may be
legally appropriate. The case most likely to arise is that in which
widespread violence, as for example, rioting, is not brought under
control by state and local authorities who are unwilling or unable
to do so. This situation appears to meet the statutory criteria, and
may describe the Birmingham crisis of 1963.
A second situation to which section 333 would be applicable is
a general breakdown of local law enforcement efforts, as existed in
1871. By comparison, it is doubtful that such conditions exist to-
day. To extend this point somewhat further, it may be that if local
officials fail to execute the law so as to protect a portion of the
population from crime or violence, then intervention would be pos-
sible. 16 3 This of course assumes that conditions have deteriorated
to the point at which the execution of federal laws is hindered to
the extent that force supplementary to the usual civil authorities is
required.
A third situation is somewhat more doubtful. Suppose that the
state or local authorities use extreme or repressive police methods
261 In commenting upon the federalism issue, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for
the Court in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), indicated the traditional
balance of functions in the federal system: "[Statutory construction] should . . .
respect the proper balance between the States and the federal government in law en-
forcement. Violation of local law does not necessarily mean that federal rights have
been invaded. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment did not alter the basic relations
between the States and the national government.... Our national government is one
of delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the administration of criminal
justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those
delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States." Id. at 108-09.
162 The spirit of Theodore Roosevelt's assertion "'better twenty-four hours of riot,
damage, and disorder than illegal use of troops,'" quoted in RIcH, op. cit. supra
note 133, at 129, has pervaded the attitude of the federal government in most
instances.
"' See note 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
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against a segment of the population. Paragraph 1 of section 333 is
excluded, unless one indulges in the apparent fiction that such
methods "hinder" a "proper" execution of state law. There is a
greater possibility of justifying intervention, however, in connection
with paragraph 2. It might be argued in the situation posited that
violators of federal law, in particular of section 242164 which
proscribes the deprivation "under color of any law" of any person
of his federal constitutional rights, have become so numerous and
difficult otherwise to apprehend as to require extraordinary federal
force to subdue them. The result of all of this, however, might be
the fascinating spectacle of federal troops confronting a contingent
of state police in an attempt to arrest the latter for the commission
of a federal misdemeanorl
Section 333 of course was not intended to operate in isolation,
and its potential effectiveness as both a deterrent and an ultimate
sanction depends to some extent upon complementary federal civil
rights legislation.165 The buttressing of these provisions appears
requisite to an effective implementation of federal authority.'66
1-118 U.S.C. § 242 (1964). See note 34 supra.
105 It is open to question whether change is desirable in the present wording of
§ 333. In an area of such sensitivity as the domestic use of military power, one must
concede a good deal of discretion to the Executive. Furthermore, the interpretive
gloss placed upon the statute, that it authorizes the use of federal force when the
ordinary state and federal civil processes are unable and/or fail to execute the laws
in order to protect the constitutional rights of a portion of the population, appears
to provide an adequate vehicle for the protection of those rights. On the other
hand, the requirement that state law be hindered in its execution may tend to
allow a highly subtle Presidential query as to whether, and in what sense, that law
is "hindered" to impede federal protection of federal constitutional rights. Al-
ternatively, it may be suggested that the clearer the statutory terms, the less oppor-
tunity there is for a President to mask a crucial political decision behind the ob-
scurity of the statute. Furthermore, the revitalization of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1964)
(see notes 34 and 64-69 supra and accompanying text) fills a void, allowing federal
prosecution of violence which is less widespread and uncontrolled than the conditions
contemplated by § 333. See note 23 supra.
However all this may be, with attention focused upon jury selection and federal
punishment of civil rights crimes, there are no clarion calls for alterations of § 333.
This, in the final analysis, may be just as well.
''The usefulness of one venerable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964), has been
greatly increased by the recent Supreme Court cases of United States v. Price, 86 Sup.
Ct. 1152 (1966), and United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966). See note 34 and
notes 64-69 supra and accompanying text.
It has been suggested that 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964) would be improved and
strengthened by eliminating therefrom the scienter requirement of Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1945). Thus the statute could be amended to make clear
its application to "(a) any act or omission which the accused knew or should have
known would deprive such [constitutional] rights; or (b) any act or omission con-
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Thus a reluctant federal government assumes greater power for the
protection of constitutional rights, which protection some states in
derogation of their basic responsibilities have failed to extend.
stituting a crime of violence within the penal laws of the State, Territory or District
within which it took place." Kates and Emerson, Memorandum of Law: Adequacy
of Present Federal Criminal Legislation in the Civil Rights Field and Draft
Statutes, pt. I-B, at 4, 1965. The authors also suggest an amendment to § 241, bot-
tomed on the commerce clause, to punish perpetrators of racial violence on streets
and highways. Id., pt. I-A, at 1, 8. It might also be suggested that the penalty
provisions of both § 241 and § 242 be increased and that § 241 be transformed into a
substantive rather than a conspiratorial offenses. For an alternate suggestion regard-
ing § 241, see note 155 supra. For the conclusions of the United States Civil Rights
Commission concerning the inadequacies of §§ 241 and 242 and its recommendations
for congressional action in the criminal field, see U.S. CIVIL RiGHTs CoMtM'N, LAW
ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 108-19, 177-78 (1965);
1961 U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS REP., JUSTICE 45-55, 110-13. For an extensive draft statute to
bring "civil rights crimes" within the scope of federal jurisdiction, see Amsterdam,
Memorandum: "Civil Rights Protection Act of 1966" (White House Conference "To
Fulfill These Rights'), Nov. 16, 1965.
